May 2013

Cyber Security Investigation and Online Tracking

by Ude Lu, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff.

Ude-Lue.jpgOn April 18th, 2013, Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) was passed with wide spread controversies. CISPA aims to help national security agencies to investigate cyber threats by allowing private companies, such as Google and Facebook, to search users’ personal data to identify possible threats. Commentators argue that CISPA compromises the Fourth Amendment, because, under CISPA, agencies can get privacy data of suspects identified by the privacy companies without a judicial order. CISPA bridges the gap between crime investigations and the privacy data stored and analyzed by social media companies.

Google and Facebook regularly track their user’s online behaviors, such as websites they visited or products they purchased, to figure out their personal preferences to perform targeted advertisements. These personal behavior analyses raise serious privacy concerns. Omer Tene and Jules Polonetsky in their article published in Volume 13 Issue 1 of the Minnesota Journal of Law Science and Technology, To Track or “Do Not Track: Advancing Transparency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising discussed these privacy concerns.

Tene and Polonetsky described that while targeted advertisement provides many advantages, one particular criticism is that users are deprived from meaningful control of their data. This led to various administrative proposals in the US and EU. In the US, FTC proposed “Do Not Track”, a signal sent by users’ browser to internet content providers requesting them not to track cookies. In the EU, the e-Privacy Directive required an opt-in consent for cookie tracking. The authors argue that whether cookie tracking should be “opt-in” or “opt-out” depends on how tracking is valued by the society. If the society in general values tracking as a positive measure to provide valuable services, then opt-out should be applied. On the contrary, if tracking is viewed by the society as an invasion to privacy, then opt-in should be applied.


Will AIA Post-Grant Procedures Reduce Litigation?

by Nihal Parkar, UMN Law Student, MJLST StaffNihal-Parkar-Thumbnail-White-Back.jpgThe America Invents Act (AIA) was signed into law in 2011 and fully went into effect on March 16, 2013. The AIA resulted from efforts to strengthen the US patent system and bring it in conformity with global patenting standards. One of the aims of the AIA was to reduce post-grant litigation related to patent validity. It is common for alleged infringers to challenge the validity of patents that are asserted against them in court. However, such litigation can be expensive and protracted.

Pre-AIA patent law did provide for some processes for challenging patent validity, but they were limited. The AIA tries to expand on pre-existing post-grant patent challenges by providing for patent challenge procedures that mirror litigation (discovery, witness examination, and so on) at an alternative forum for resolving validity disputes: the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at the US Patent and Trademark Office.

It is interesting to contrast pre-AIA scholarly analysis of patent challenge procedures and suggested reforms with post-AIA studies. The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology provides two contrasting articles on point. An earlier, pre-AIA article by Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact (8 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 2006) proposed a multistage post-grant review process. They addressed the lack of discovery and other issues in pre-AIA post-grant processes, and concluded that discovery would be unnecessary as long as the scope of reviewable issues was kept narrow. A recent MJLST note by Kayla Fossen, The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling Short (14 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 573, 2013), reviews the changes introduced by the AIA, and points out that post-grant processes cannot really undo the damage created by ineffective pre-grant procedures. Therefore, the AIA is unlikely to significantly impact post-grant litigation.


Shapewear Patent War: Case of the Bad Patent?

by Jennifer Nomura, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Jennifer-Nomura.jpgWhen most people think of patents they think of the latest computer technology or advances in medical science; but what about women’s shapewear? For those unaware of what shapewear is, it’s basically the modern version of a corset; it keeps everything pulled in, but (hopefully) more comfortable than a corset. Heather Thomson, founder of Yummie Tummie, has a patent on some of her styles of tank-top shapewear. Corset_Patent_Image.jpgWhen she found out that Spanx, a competing company, was making a very similar looking piece of shapewear, Thomson wasn’t happy. Thomson sent a cease-and-desist letter to Sara Blakely, founder of Spanx and then took to social media to complain. Websites like Forbes and the Huffington Post picked up the story. So far, the situation sounds fairly typical of other patent infringement cases, so why all the press coverage? Did I mention that Heather Thomson is a TV star of Bravo’s Real Housewives of New York? Needless to say, Thomson is not afraid of a little drama. Thomson has declared war against Blakely and Spanx. But Sara Blakely is not the underdog in this situation. Blakely founded Spanx in 2000 and is now a self-made billionaire. Blakely has now filed a declaratory judgment action in court alleging that Spanx is not infringing any of Yummie Tummie’s patents.

Spanx has been in the shapewear business 8 years longer than Yummie Tummie and has its own patents, so this might be the case of the “bad patent”. In an article entitled Patent Reform and Differential Impact, published in Issue 8.1 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, authors Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde define a “bad patent” as one “that should not have been issued.” But Sag and Rohde want to go further. HeatherThomasPatent-cmp.jpg They argue that the term “bad patent” should also include “a patent that was validly issued but is now the subject of hyper-assertion.” The main concern with bad patents is that they “are capable of generating significant revenues and thus have a distorting effect on the allocation of resources in the economy.” This can happen where once a patentee sends a cease-and-desist letter, even if the patent qualifies as a “bad patent,” the alleged infringer will immediately license with the patentee. Or it could be that the parties could take their dispute to court, like Spanx and Yummie Tummie. Now there will be an expenditure of money on both sides trying to settle this issue in court. There is also a drain on public resources as the conflict has to make its way through the court system. Sag and Rohde make several proposed reforms in order to remedy the problem of bad patents. One of their proposed reforms to the litigation process is by fee-shifting. Fee-shifting would require the patentee to pay the costs of litigation if the patent was invalidated based on easily-discoverable prior art. This proposed reform could push potential patent applicants to perform a more comprehensive search through current patents before submitting their application to the PTO. Fee-shifting could prevent bad patents from being issued in the first place, or at least making patentees think twice before they try to enforce their patent against an alleged infringer.

While the public’s interest in the dispute between Yummie Tummie and Spanx has more to do with the reputations of both founders, this situation could revive a push for reform to the patent litigation system. Perhaps there will be a revival of the interest to limit or eliminate “bad patents.”