2014

Oops! They Did it Again . . .

February 4, 2014
First Amendment, Healthcare, Healthcare Reform

Roma Patel, MJLST Staff
The Affordable Care Act is making its way back to the Supreme Court, this time with a different mandate under judicial scrutiny. In November the Court announced it would hear Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., regarding the comprehensive, yet controversial, health care law. Unlike National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, where the Court upheld the ACA’s individual mandate to buy health insurance as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing power, the Hobby Lobby case involves a religious liberty challenge against the ACA’s requirement that employers provide insurance coverage for contraception and some drugs that some believe cause abortions.

Hobby Lobby is a private corporation that owns arts-and-crafts stores throughout the country. The company is owned by the Green family, Evangelical Christians who believe that life begins at fertilization. Because Hobby Lobby is a for-profit employer of more than 50 people, the ACA will require it to provide insurance coverage of a full range contraception.

In June 2013 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby, stating that corporate entities are entitled to religious freedom. The 3rd and 6th Circuits split from the 10th Circuit and held that for-profit corporations do not have religious rights on two other cases challenging the ACA. On September 19, both Hobby Lobby and the 3rd Circuit case, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, were appealed to the Supreme Court.

Commentary on the Hobby Lobby case can best be described as dicey. Conservative and religious bloggers have hurled phrases such as, “atheist bullies” and “an attack on First Amendment rights” while the left cry, “war on women” and “crazed bible thumpers.” The broader issues at stake here are understandably divisive and extremely personal.

Amidst the often-exacerbated discussion of the case and the issues surrounding it is a desperate need to set the record straight: this is not a First Amendment issue, per se. What the Supreme Court will decide is Whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq., which provides that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest, allows a for-profit corporation to deny its employees the health coverage of contraceptives to which the employees are otherwise entitled by federal law, based on the religious objections of the corporation’s owners.

Hobby Lobby argues the provision forces it to pay for methods of contraception which the owners find religiously immoral; namely the Plan B morning-after pill, an emergency contraceptive called Ella, and two different kinds of intrauterine devices (IUDs) that may sometimes work by preventing a fertilized egg from implanting into the uterus.

Counsel for the government argues that rights to religious freedoms do not apply to for-profit corporations and that health decisions should be between a woman and her physician, there is no place to an employer to impose his or her personal beliefs on someone else’s.

Amicus briefs have been flooding the Supreme Court’s doors defending both sides of the issue. Questions of corporate personhood and whether the Court’s decision could open a huge hole in the longstanding history of religion and the practice of medicine remain relevant. For example, some religions don’t believe in blood transfusions, so does that mean business owners with such beliefs can refuse to provide insurance coverage for an employee’s transfusion? Religious beliefs are personal and deeply subjective, how can health policy makers expand on patient coverage without being at odds with subjective beliefs?

The ultimate question is whether the ACA unduly infringes on the right to religious expression or if it pursues the least restrictive means of enforcing its provision on contraception with regard to the First Amendment. The result of Hobby Lobby will be close and the case will be one to watch.

Akamai Provides a New Induced Infringement Standard, But How Do We Use It?

February 3, 2014
Intellectual Property, Patents

Ryan J. Connell, MJLST Lead Articles Editor

In the spring 2013 issue of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology Mr. Roy D. Gross examined the use of circumstantial evidence to prove inducement of infringement. Mr. Gross’s article is titled Can an Inference of Intent to Induce Infringement of a Patent Be Drawn Where Other Reasonable Inferences Exist? An Examination of the Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Inducement of Infringement. Mr. Gross ultimately argues that that the doctrine of specific intent to infringe in patent cases should be harmonized with the standard used for inequitable conduct.

It is important to discern the boundaries of specific intent to infringe in light of the recent Akamai case. Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Akamai the Federal Circuit arguably made it easier for a patent owner to hold a person liable for induced infringement of a method claim when no single person performed all the steps of the method. The Akamai decision still requires the alleged inducer to have the specific intent to induce infringement. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308. The results of Akamai are mixed then, on one hand patent owners can now go after those who induced infringement but never induced a single party to infringe the patent. On the other hand the patent owner must still provide evidence of a specific intent to induce infringement.

Proving induced infringement is a difficult task. Direct evidence of inducement is often hard to come by and the patent owner must often resort to using circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent. Mr. Gross suggests courts to weigh the following three factors, in light of circumstantial evidence, when determining if the requisite intent is present: (1) nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe.

Akamai has closed an undesirable loophole in patent law. For Akamai to reach its full potential however, courts and litigators need to understand how to weigh circumstantial evidence that may be more strained in cases where a patent is collectively infringed as opposed to directly infringed by one actor. Articles such as this can help the legal community understand how to use circumstantial evidence in light of the new induced infringement standard.

Akamai Provides a New Induced Infringement Standard, But How Do We Use It?

February 3, 2014
Intellectual Property, Patents

Ryan J. Connell, MJLST Lead Articles Editor

Crime and Treatment: A Creative Drug Policy

February 3, 2014
Criminal Law, Drug Policy

by Shirshira Kother, MJLST Staff

In our society, it seems as though drug addiction is a commonality for prison inmates. It tends to play some role in every crime scene and horrific headline that we hear about. Drugs have been a driving force for many criminals because it significantly alters their decision-making and ultimately affects their actions. While there is no mistake that those who act under the influence of drugs will be subject to justice system, there perhaps a better way to discourage this behavior by redefining addiction.

An article titled Why Neuroscience Matters for Rational Drug Policy in volume 11 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology, explores the possibility of addiction as a neurological problem that may be solved by specific treatment to rewire an individual’s brain. David M. Eagleman, Mark A. Correro & Jyotpal Singh analyze how consistent use of chemical substances destruct areas of the brain that control voluntary actions.

David M. Eagleman, Mark A. Correro & Jyotpal Singh analyze how consistent use of chemical substances destruct areas of the brain that control voluntary actions. The article continues to explain how policy regarding drug use and addiction should be more geared toward treating those affected by the condition versus punishing them for becoming addicted. They suggest that chronic users may not actually continue their use on their own accord but are driven their brains. Chemical abuse can restructure the functions within the brain and lead many criminals to act out of deprivation of the drug. This concept has come across several arguments, most of which revolve around the policy effect of allowing criminals to “blame their brains” for their actions. The authors however suggest that the mere explanation of chemical abuse and how its effects have led to a crime does not, relieve the individual of their responsibility. It allows the system to better rehabilitate the individual.

The process suggested would mirror the procedure used to treat an aliment in order to restore one’s health. The use of drugs is associated with positive stimulus and once the brain has been repeated exposed to a chemical, it becomes dependent on that stimulus to function and destroys behavior inhibition, which often leads to impulsivity. Depriving it of the substance can cause severe side affects to the individual and drive them to act without thought or reason. The article introduces two new radical methods in rehabilitating these individuals. Most medications used to treat addicts either reduce the positive response the drug elicits or counter acts the reaction by producing a negative one. By using real time neuroimaging, doctors can better understand cues associated with craving and try to override the responses to those cues. A second suggested method is a vaccine to block the receptors related to the positive response addicts experience when using drugs. This vaccine would not allow the addict to get high thus reducing their use.

While still fairly new, these two innovations can change rehabilitation of those incarcerated from chemical use and abuse related crimes. Perhaps, the biggest concern is whether these options will have long-term positive effects and keep the individuals off of drugs. If successful, this method would not only remove potentially dangerous individuals from society but also groom them to rejoin the world: chemical free.

Guest Commentary – Climate Change: Is Anyone Ever Going to Do Anything about it?

February 3, 2014
Environment, Public Health

by Myanna Dellinger, JD, MA – Associate Professor at Western State College of Law and Director of the Institute for Global Law and Policy

Extremely cold weather conditions still haunt the American North and Northeast. Meanwhile, California is suffering through July temperatures in January and the worst drought since 1895. No doubt about it, we are witnessing ever more frequent extreme weather events. Since nations still can’t agree on what to do about this urgent problem, it may be up to local actors such as cities, states, companies, and NGOs to take the required action now.

Nations have agreed to “try” to limit global warming to 2° C and to agree on a new climate treaty by 2015 to take effect by 2020, but in reality, we are headed towards a 5.3° C increase. Even if the 2° degree target were to be met, vast ecological and economic damage would still occur in the form of, for instance, severe economic disruptions to our food and water supply.

Disregarding climate change is technologically risky too: to meet the target of keeping concentrations of CO2 below the most recently agreed-upon threshold of 500 ppm, future generations would have to literally pull CO2 out of the air with either machinery that does not yet exist and may never become technically or economically feasible, or with bioenergy crops that absorb CO2, which would compete with food production.

My article “Localizing Climate Change” argues that effective and urgent action is likely to come from the local and not the national or international levels.

In fact, the parties to the climate treaty framework UNFCCC similarly recently agreed that cities, other subnational authorities, and the private sector must play a role in future treaty-making contexts. This makes sense. Local actors may be the ones best situated to find out what can be done technically and politically in each location. Meanwhile, nations are almost unbelievably playing two fiddles at the same time, subsidizing fossil fuel development much more than cleaner energies. That’s right: although renewable energy policies are becoming more prevalent, they are financially and politically outcompeted by the rapid growth of fossil fuels in the USA and elsewhere. Perhaps indicative of the true state of affairs is the fact that climate adaptation talks are intensifying as mitigation agreements seem to be stalling. It doesn’t help that a secretive network of conservative billionaires is pouring billions of dollars into a vast political effort attempting to deny climate change and that–perhaps as a consequence–the coverage of climate change by American media is down significantly from 2009, when media was happy to report a climate change “scandal” that eventually proved to be incorrectly reported. Little wonder that the most recent IPCC report concluded that it is “extremely likely” (i.e. with 95-100% certainty) that human activity is the principal cause of climate change.

If you think all this is driving you crazy, you may be right. Shifts in climate have been strongly linked to human violence around the world, such as spikes in domestic violence in Australia, increased assaults and murders in the United States, land invasions in Brazil, police violence in Holland, and civil conflicts throughout the tropics.

What are we, as a nation, doing about this? In the summer of 2013, President Obama announced the first-ever United States Climate Action Plan. This relies on a number of Executive Orders, as the Senate is still unlikely to ratify a climate treaty. As with other recent Congressional gridlock, this highlights the importance of local action. If the United States was willing to ratify a new climate change treaty, this could spur much-needed action by the relatively low number of nations needed to make a big impact on the problem. After all, the world’s top ten emitters account for 70% of global greenhouse gas emissions.

This leads to my questions: Where is the most likely and substantively effective action going to come from: local or national/supranational entities? If you think climate change must be countered at the national and international levels, who is then responsible? For instance, should it be the historically largest emitters (among them, the USA and China), the most capable (the industrialized world), the most progressive (arguably the EU), or . . . ? Is anything even going to happen at all, or are we as human beings simply incapable of worrying about the future as a recent study indicated?

It’s a bird, no, it’s a plane, no, it’s … an Amazon delivery-drone?

January 29, 2014
Law Enforecement

by Katelyn DeRuyter, UMN Law Student, MJLST Note and Comment Editor

I recently typed “legal issues drone usage” into Google and was surprised by what I found. Along with several articles on the U.S.’s drone program (as expected), I was also greeted by reports of an Amazon project to have unmanned aerial drones make deliveries. For those who don’t know, Amazon is an online retailer of … well, almost everything. This drone project, first announced on CBS’ ’60 Minutes’, is called “Prime Air” and may be viable in as few as 4-5 years. While there is wide speculation over whether this project is real or just a publicity stunt, it does present some interesting legal and law-enforcement considerations.

First, the reported facts:

The drones would be autonomous, meaning they would not be remotely piloted. Rather, the small rotorcrafts would use GPS technology to travel to and from delivery addresses. The drones currently being tested have a range of 10 miles and can lift packages weighing up to 5 lbs. Such packages account for approximately 86% of Amazon’s deliveries. It is easy to see the business advantages of such a delivery program. However, is this program currently legal?

The Legal Landscape:

Police and various governmental organizations are allowed to fly drones as long as they have obtained FAA approval. Non-governmental use of drones is limited to hobbyists and there are strict restrictions. For example, hobby drones cannot go above 400 feet and must stay within the operator’s sight. This will soon change. In early 2012, Congress passed the Reauthorization Act, a $63 billion funding bill for 4 years of FAA funding. One of the provisions of this Act is that the FAA must allow for the wider use of drones for both governmental and commercial use. Specifically, the FAA must allow for commercial use of drones by Sept. 30, 2015.

Given the Reauthorization Act, it seems probable that Amazon’s Prime Air, and other similar programs, may soon be legal. However, are such programs advisable? Along with potential liability issues if the drones malfunction and cause injury, there are broader policy issues to be addressed.

Law Enforcement Challenges:

The ability for drone deliveries may be a vast complication for law enforcement. By cutting out USPS, FedEx, UPS and other more “traditional” shipping methods, drone deliveries may also circumvent a lot of the screening and tracking that occurs with shipping. These screening and tracking systems are vital to law enforcement’s efforts to detect, stop and prosecute a variety of crimes – spanning from drug trafficking to bioterrorism.

If the law enforcement hurdles can be overcome, and I think it is likely that they can, drone-deliveries will probably become commonplace. It will be interesting to watch how the law adapts to fit this evolving technology.

Please feel free to leave any comments and thoughts!

Cellular Metadata and the Fourth Amendment

January 29, 2014
Privacy

by Paul Overbee, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

In Volume 9, Issue 1 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Manish Kumar wrote a note titled Constitutionalizing E-Mail Privacy by Informational Access. The note used the reasoning of a Supreme Court case, Kyllo v. United States, to create a framework with which to analyze what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in terms of an individual’s e-mails. The test identified by Kumar was to ask whether the government has to employ special means not available to the public to access any allegedly private information. If the government is employing special means in the course of a search, then that search is subject to Fourth Amendment protections. The note continued by using that rationale as one way to assess e-mail privacy.

Legal inquiries such as those presented in Kumar’s note are now receiving greater attention since the recent events involving Edward Snowden. Edward Snowden, a former National Security Agency employee, was involved in leaking documents that have detailed many of the National Security Agency’s global surveillance practices. One aspect of these leaks detailed how the National Security Agency requires cell phone companies such as Verizon to collect metadata for all telephone conversations involving individuals from the United States. Since these metadata collections were made public, a number of lawsuits have challenged the constitutionality of the procedure as an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

This Fourth Amendment question has been dealt with in two distinct manners, each of which brings a separate conclusion. Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colombia found that the technology used in gathering the metadata employed a special means not available to the public and thus constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure. Alternatively, Judge William Pauley III of the Southern District of New York found that these methods to do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

This issue has already caught the attention of the general public, and it is no stretch to expect the Supreme Court to eventually hear these cases. The Pauley opinion and the Leon opinion both provide a good overview of the arguments available for both sides of the issue. Additionally, the court may look to the test from Kyllo v. United States to further guide their opinion.

What does it Mean to be Human?

January 20, 2014
Bioethics

by Mike Walls, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

What does it mean to be human? Where does our conception of life and death come from? Scholars and writers alike have been toiling with these questions for centuries. Our understanding of the term “human” is often embedded in the culture we grew up in. For some, human may simply mean the physical embodiment of our soul. To them, the human form is no more than just a transitory stage in our soul’s celestial journey. For others, the term is specifically defined by our genetic makeup, chromosome for chromosome, allele for allele, etc. However, our legal understanding of “human” has been especially difficult to discern. States have taken many different approaches.

In his article, “Defining the Essence of Being Human,” Professor Efthimios Parasidis discusses various states’ interpretations of human. Parasidis discusses Ohio’s interpretation of human life as beginning when one can detect the fetal heartbeat. For Ohio citizens, life begins with the beating heart, but it is unclear what this definition means for heart-related anomalies in adult-life, such as a person whose heart ceases to pump blood temporarily. Nebraska focuses on whether pain can be detected in the fetus, although the Act glosses over individuals who are incapable of experiencing pain, or fetus’s with delayed sensory development. Mississippi’s unsuccessful amendment attempted to define “person” as “every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the equivalent thereof,” which left the door open to further criticism. Should splicing human genes with animal genes necessarily discount human-like organisms from our understanding of human? Would a “manimal” have been covered under the Mississippi law? It appears that elsewhere around the world introducing animal genes into the human form is forbidden, whereas human genes introduced into animals is sometimes permitted.

Parasidis’ discussion of various states’ conceptions of human life involving pain, heartbeats, and fertilization, led him to attempt to answer the question: “What distinguishes humans from other species?” His answer fell into two categories, the anthropological record (Homo sapiens, Homo neanderthalensis, etc.) and genetics. He concluded that both explanations are vague (or at least their boundary lines do more to raise serious questions than to console skeptics).

As I ponder Parasidis’ article as a grown-up, the kid in me has found it difficult to set aside my childhood curiosity for science-fiction. What wisdom could I take from science-fiction without getting sidetracked? I turned to Dr. Moreau for answers. In 1896, H.G. Wells published The Island of Dr. Moreau, based on a mad-scientist destined to create half-men, half-animals, through vivisection. Wells wrote this piece without knowledge of genes or modern discoveries in anthropology and human origins. Wells’ interpretation of human and animal is both poetic and informative, and his philosophy on scientific inquiry plagued by moral dilemmas speaks through Dr. Moreau.

Astonished by the bestial creatures he saw on Dr. Moreau’s island, the weary naturalist Prendrick viewed Moreau as a heartless scientist, detached from the ethical world we live in. In my favorite chapter, Dr. Moreau Explains, Moreau lays out his unadorned view on the commonalities between man and animal. After Dr. Moreau inserts a blade into his own thigh, he states the following:

“Then I am a religious man, Prendrick, as every sane man must be. It may be I fancy I have seen more of the ways of this world’s Maker than you–for I have sought his laws, in my way, all my life, while you, I understand, have been collecting butterflies. And I tell you, pleasure and pain have nothing to do with heaven and hell. Pleasure and pain–Bah! . . . men and women set on pleasure and pain, Prendrick, is the mark of the beast upon them, the mark of the beast from which they came. Pain! Pain and pleasure–they are for us, only so long as we wriggle in the dust . . . .”

On the one extreme, Dr. Moreau believed that anything fathomed under the laws of science (and thus, to him, created by God), was permissible scientific inquiry. To him, pain is unmistakably detached from religion–rather it is incidental to experimentation. Moreover, Dr. Moreau believed pain is simply whatever we make of the sensation (“The capacity for pain is not needed in the muscle, and only here and there over the thigh is a spot capable of feeling pain. Pain is simply our intrinsic medical adviser to warn us and stimulate us.”). Moreau’s religion is his scientific inquiry, completely unfettered from ethical obligations. On the other hand, Nebraska takes the opposite view. Pain is the factor between life and death. But for Nebraskan legislators, is the criterion of inflicting “pain” on a fetus any more of a medical description than it is a moral obligation? Dr. Moreau and Professor Parasidis would probably argue that simply detecting pain is a smokescreen for anti-abortionists. The Nebraskan viewpoint that pain is a medical factor that necessarily dictates abortion rights might be fogging the issue. I struggle to understand some of our states’ preemptive abortion policies, as does Professor Parasidis, in their inability to separate conceptions of human life (when pain is felt) from their legal obligations owed to the individual (informed by science).

The point of all this is rather simple. No matter how we decide to determine what is human, or when life begins, public policy should influence how exacting our legal definition of human is. Dr. Moreau wouldn’t sacrifice scientific inquiry for the ethical norms of others. To him, everyone else must reconcile their moral differences with science. Professor Parasidis argues that when legislators use descriptive characteristics (like pain) in their legal definitions, they should also consider other policy implications. Besides the fetus, who else is affected? By redirecting our focus to science, we may free ourselves from biases currently clouding our reproductive rights jurisprudence, and potentially answer the question, what is the essence of being human?

Target Data Security Breach: It’s Lawsuit Time!

January 20, 2014
Privacy

by Jenny Warfield, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

On December 19th, 2013, Target announced that it fell victim to the second-largest security attack in US retail history. While initial reports showed the hack compromised only the credit and debit card information (including PIN numbers and CVV codes) of 40 million customers, recent findings revealed that the names, phone numbers, mailing addresses, and email addresses of 70 million shoppers between November 27 to December 15 had also been stolen.

As history has proved time and again, massive data security breaches lead to lawsuits. When Heartland Payment Systems (a payment card processing service for small and mid-sized businesses) had its information on 130 million credit and debit card holders exposed in a 2009 cyber-attack, it faced lawsuits by banks and credit card companies for the costs of replacing cards, extending branch hours, and refunding consumers for fraudulent transactions. These lawsuits have so far cost the company $140 million in settlements (with litigation ongoing). Similarly, when TJX Company (parent of T.J. Maxx) had its accounts hacked in 2007, it cost the company $256 million in settlements.

Target currently faces at least 15 lawsuits in state and federal court seeking class action status, and several other lawsuits by individuals across the country. Common themes by the claimants are that 1) Target failed to properly secure customer data (more specifically, that Target did not abide by Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council Data Security Standards “PCI DSS”); 2) Target failed to promptly notify customers of the security breach in violation of state notification statutes, preventing customers from taking steps to protect against fraud; 3) Target violated the Federal Stored Communications Act; 4) and Target breached its implied contracts with its customers.

A quick review of past data breach cases reveals that these plaintiffs face an uphill battle, especially in the class-action context. While financial institutions and credit card companies can point to pecuniary damages in the form of costs associated with card replacements and customer refunds for fraudulent transactions (as in the TJX and Heartland cases), the damages suffered by plaintiffs in these cases are usually speculative. Not only are customers almost always refunded for transactions they did not make, it is unclear how to value the loss of information like home addresses and phone numbers in the absence of evidence that such information has been used to the customer’s detriment. As a result, almost all of the class action suits brought against companies in cyber-attacks have failed.

However, the causes of the cyber-attack on Target are still unclear, and it may be too early to speculate on Target’s liability. Target is currently being investigated by the DOJ (and potentially the FTC) for its role in the data breach while also conducting its own investigation in partnership with the U.S. Secret Service. In any event, affected customers should take advantage of Target’s year-long free credit monitoring while waiting for more facts to unfold.

Can I Keep It Private? Privacy Laws in Various Contexts

January 19, 2014
Privacy

by Ude Lu, UMN Law Student, MJLST Articles Editor

Target Corp., the second-largest retailer in the nation, announced to its customers on Dec 20, 2013 that its payment card data had been breached. About 40 million customers who shopped at Target between Nov. 27 and Dec. 15, 2013 using credit or debit cards are affected. The stolen information includes the customer’s name, credit or debit card number, and the card’s expiration date. [Update: The breach may have affected over 100 million customers, and additional kinds of information may have been disclosed.]

This data breach stirred public discussions about data security and privacy protections. Federal Trade (FTC) Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen said on Jan. 6, during a Twitter chat, that this event highlights the need for consumer and business education on data security.

In the US, the FTC’s privacy protection enforcement runs on a “broken promise” framework. This means the FTC will enforce privacy protection according to what a business entity promised to its customers. Privacy laws have increasing importance in wake of the information age.

Readers of this blog are encouraged to explore the following four articles published in MJLST, discussing privacy laws in various contexts:

Constitutionalizing E-mail Privacy by Informational Access, by Manish Kumar. This article highlights the legal analyses of email privacy under the Fourth Amendment.

It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining and Voter Privacy in the Information Age, by Chris Evans. This article explores the unique threats to privacy protection posed by political data-mining.

Privacy and Public Health in the Information Age: Electronic Health Records and the Minnesota Health Records Act, by Kari Bomash. This article examines the adequacy of the Minnesota Health Records Act (MHRA) that the state passed to meet then-Governor Pawlenty’s 2015 mandate requiring every health care provider in Minnesota to have electronic health records.

An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government, by Christopher Soghoian. This article explores how businesses vary in disclosing privacy information of their clients to governmental agencies.

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