December 2021

The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”): Not a Trademark Court but a Narrow Administrative Procedure Against Abusive Registrations

Thao Nguyen, MJLST Staffer

Anyone can register a domain name through one of the thousands of registrars on a first-come, first-serve basis at a low cost. The ease of entry has created so-called “cybersquatters,” who register for domain names that reflect trademarks before the true trademark owners are able to do so. Cybersquatters often aim to profit from cybersquatting activities, either by selling the domain names back to the trademark holders for a higher price, by generating confusion in order to take advantage of the trademark’s goodwill, or by diluting the trademark and disrupting the business of a competitor. A single cybersquatter can cybersquat on several thousand domain names that incorporate well-known trademarks.

Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP provides that the complainant must successfully establish all three of the following of elements: (i) that the disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; (ii) that the registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and (iii) that the registrant registered and is using the domain name in bad faith. Remedies for a successful complainant include cancellation or transfer to the complainant of the disputed domain name.

Although prized for being focused, expedient, and inexpensive, the UDRP is not without criticism, the bulk of which focuses on the issue of fairness. The frequent charge is that the UDRP is inherently biased in favor of trademark owners and against domain name holders, not all of whom are “cybersquatters.” This bias is indicated by statistics: 75% to 90% of URDP decisions each year are decided against the domain name owner.

Nonetheless, the asymmetry of outcomes, rather than being a sign of an unfair arbitration process, may simply reflect the reality that most UDRP complaints are brought when there is a clear case of abuse, and most respondents in the proceeding are true cybersquatters who knowingly and willfully violated the UDRP. Therefore, what may appear to be the UDRP’s shortcomings are in facts signs that the UDRP is fulfilling its primary purpose. Furthermore, to appreciate the UDRP proceeding and understand the asymmetry that might normally raise red flags in an adjudication, one must understand that the UDRP is not meant to resolve trademark dispute. A representative case where this purpose is addressed is Cameron & Company, Inc. v. Patrick Dudley, FA1811001818217 (FORUM Dec. 26, 2018), where the Panel wrote, “cases involving disputes regarding trademark rights and usage, trademark infringement, unfair competition, deceptive trade practices and related U.S. law issues are beyond the scope of the Panel’s limited jurisdiction under the Policy.” In other words, the UDRP’s scope is limited to detecting and reversing the damages of cybersquatting, and the administrative dispute-resolution procedure is streamlined for this purpose.[1]

That the UDRP is not a trademark court is evident in the UDRP’s refusal to handle cases where multiple legitimate complainants assert right to a single domain name registered by a cybersquatter. UDRP Rule 3(a) states: “Any person or entity may initiate an administrative proceeding by submitting a complaint.” The Forum’s Supplemental Rule 1(e) defines “The Party Initiating a Complaint Concerning a Domain Name Registration” as a “single person or entity claiming to have rights in the domain name, or multiple persons or entities who have a sufficient nexus who can each claim to have rights to all domain names listed in the Complaint.” UDRP cases with two or more complainants in a proceeding are possible only when the complainants are affiliated with each other as to share a single license to a trademark,[2] for example, when the complainant is assigned rights to a trademark registered by another entity,[3] or when the complainant has a subsidiary relationship with the trademark registrant.[4]

Since the UDRP does not resolve a good faith trademark dispute but intervenes only when there is clear abuse, the respondent’s bad faith is central: a domain name may be confusingly similar or even identical to a trademark, and yet a complainant cannot prevail if the respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name and/or did not register and use the domain name in bad faith.[5] For this reason, the UDRP sets a high standard for the complainant to establish respondent’s bad faith. For example, UDRP provides a defense if the domain name registrant has made demonstrable preparations to use the domain name in a bona fide offering of goods or services. On the other hand, the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) only provides a defense if there is prior good faith use of the domain name, not simply preparation to use. Another distinction between the UDRP and the ACPA is that the UDRP requires that complainant prove bad faith in both registration and use of the disputed domain to prevail, whereas the ACPA only requires complainant to prove bad faith in either registration or use.

Such a high standard for bad faith indicates that the UDRP is not equipped resolve issues where both parties dispute their respective rights in the trademark. In fact, when abuse is non-existent or not obvious, the UDRP Panel would refuse to transfer the disputed domain name from the respondent to the complainant.[6] Instead, the parties would need to resolve these claims in regular courts under either the ACPA or the Latham act. Limiting itself to addressing cybersquatting allows the UDRP to become extremely efficient in dealing with cybersquatting practices, a widespread and highly damaging abuse of the Internet age. This efficiency and ease of the UDRP process is appreciated by trademark-owning businesses and individuals, who prefer that disputes are handled promptly and economically. From the time of the UDRP’s creation until now, ICANN has not shown intention for reforming the Policy despite existing criticisms,[7] and for good reasons.

 

[Notes]

[1] Gerald M. Levine, Domain Name Arbitration: Trademarks, Domain Names, and Cybersquatting at 102 (2019).

[2] Tasty Baking, Co. & Tastykake Invs., Inc. v. Quality Hosting, FA 208854 (FORUM Dec. 28, 2003) (treating the two complainants as a single entity where both parties held rights in trademarks contained within the disputed domain names.)

[3] Golden Door Properties, LLC v. Golden Beauty / goldendoorsalon, FA 1668748 (FORUM May 7, 2016) (finding rights in the GOLDEN DOOR mark where Complainant provided evidence of assignment of the mark, naming Complainant as assignee); Remithome Corp v. Pupalla, FA 1124302 (FORUM Feb. 21, 2008) (finding the complainant held the trademark rights to the federally registered mark REMITHOME, by virtue of an assignment); Stevenson v. Crossley, FA 1028240 (FORUM Aug. 22, 2007) (“Per the annexed U.S.P.T.O. certificates of registration, assignments and license agreement executed on May 30, 1997, Complainants have shown that they have rights in the MOLD-IN GRAPHIC/MOLD-IN GRAPHICS trademarks, whether as trademark holder, or as a licensee. The Panel concludes that Complainants have established rights to the MOLD-IN GRAPHIC SYSTEMS mark pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i).”)

[4] Provide Commerce, Inc v Amador Holdings Corp / Alex Arrocha, FA 1529347 (FORUM Jan. 3, 2014) (finding that the complainant shared rights in a mark through its subsidiary relationship with the trademark holder); Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Indian Springs Motor, FA 157289 (FORUM June 23, 2003) (“Complainant has established that it has rights in the TOYOTA and LEXUS marks through TMC’s registration with the USPTO and Complainant’s subsidiary relationship with TMC.”)

[5] Levine, supra note 1, at 99; see e.g., Dr. Alan Y. Chow, d/b/a Optobionics v. janez bobnik, FA2110001967817 (FORUM Nov. 23, 2021) (refusing to transfer the <optobionics.com> domain name despite its being identical to Complainant’s OPTOBIONICS mark and formerly owned by Complainant, since “[t]he Panel finds no evidence in the Complainant’s submissions . . . [that] the Respondent a) does not have a legitimate interest in the domain name and b) registered and used the domain name in bad faith.”).

[6] Swisher International, Inc. v. Hempire State Smoke Shop, FA2106001952939 (FORUM July 27, 2021).

[7] Id. at 359.


Holy Crap: The First Amendment, Septic Systems, and the Strict Scrutiny Standard in Land Use Law

Sarah Bauer, MJLST Staffer

In the Summer of 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court released a bevy of decisions favoring religious freedom. Among these was Mast v. City of Fillmore, a case about, well, septic systems and the First Amendment. But Mast is about so much more than that: it showcases the Court’s commitment to free exercise in a variety of contexts and Justice Gorsuch as a champion of Western sensibilities. It also demonstrates that moving forward, the government is going to need work harder to support that its compelling interest in land use regulation trumps an individual’s free exercise rights.

The Facts of Mast

To understand how septic systems and the First Amendment can even exist in the same sentence, it’s important to know the facts of Mast. In the state of Minnesota, the Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) is responsible for maintaining water quality. It promulgates regulations accordingly, then local governments adopt those regulations into ordinances. Among those are prescriptive regulations about wastewater treatment. At issue is one such ordinance adopted by Fillmore County, Minnesota, that requires most homes to have a modern septic system for the disposal of gray water.

The plaintiffs in the case are Swartzentruber Amish. They sought a religious exemption from the ordinance, saying that their religion forbade the use of that technology. The MPCA instead demanded the installation of the modern system under threat of criminal penalty, civil fines, and eviction from their farms. When the MPCA rejected a low-tech alternative offered by the plaintiffs, a mulch basin system not uncommon in other states, the Amish sought relief on grounds that the ordinance violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). After losing the battle in state courts, the Mast plaintiffs took it to the Supreme Court, where the case was decided in their favor last summer.

The First Amendment and Strict Scrutiny

Mast’s issue is a land use remix of Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, another free exercise case from the same docket. Fulton, the more controversial and well-known of the two, involved the City of Philadelphia’s decision to discontinue contracts with Catholic Social Services (CSS) for placement of children in foster homes. The City said that CSS’s refusal to place children with same-sex couples violated a non-discrimination provision in both the contract and the non-discrimination requirements of the citywide Fair Practices Ordinance. The Supreme Court didn’t buy it, holding instead that the City’s policy impermissibly burdened CSS’s free exercise of religion.

The Fulton decision was important for refining the legal analysis and standards when a law burdens free exercise of religion. First, if a law incidentally burdens religion but is both 1) neutral and 2) generally applicable, then courts will not ordinarily apply a strict scrutiny standard on review. If one of those elements is not met, courts will apply strict scrutiny, and the government will need to show that the law 1) advances a compelling interest and 2) is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. The trick to strict scrutiny is this: the government’s compelling interest in denying an exception needs to apply specifically to those requesting the religious exception. A law examined under strict scrutiny will not survive if the State only asserts that it has a compelling interest in enforcing its laws generally.

Strict Scrutiny, RLUIPA, and Mast

The Mast Plaintiffs sought relief under RLUIPA. RLUIPA isn’t just a contender for Congress’s “Most Difficult to Pronounce Acronym” Award. It’s a choice legal weapon for those claiming that a land use regulation restricts free exercise of religion. The strict scrutiny standard is built into RLUIPA, meaning that courts skip straight to the question of whether 1) the government had a compelling government interest, and 2) whether the rule was the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. And now, post-Fulton, that first inquiry involves looking at whether the government had a compelling interest in denying an exception specifically as it applies to plaintiffs.

So that is how we end up with septic systems and the First Amendment in the same case. The Amish sued under RLUIPA, the Court applied strict scrutiny, and the government failed to show that it had a compelling interest in denying the Amish an exception to the rule that they needed to install a septic system for their gray water. Particularly convincing at least from Coloradan Justice Gorsuch’s perspective, were the facts that 1) Minnesota law allowed exemptions to campers and outdoorsman, 2) other jurisdictions allowed for gray water disposal in the same alternative manner suggested by the plaintiffs, and 3) the government couldn’t show that the alternative method wouldn’t effectively filter the water.

So what does this ultimately mean for land use regulation? It means that in the niche area of RLUIPA litigation, religious groups have a stronger strict scrutiny standard to lean on, forcing governments to present more evidence justifying a refusal to extend religious exemptions. And government can’t bypass the standard by making regulations more “generally applicable,” for example by removing exemptions for campers. Strict scrutiny still applies under RLUIPA, and governments are stuck with it, resulting in a possible windfall of exceptions for the religious.


How the Biden Administration Has Made Offshore Wind a Priority

Max Meyer, MJLST Staffer

Since coming into office in January of 2021, the Biden Administration has made fighting climate change and reducing domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions a priority. In particular, the Biden Administration set a goal of doubling the nation’s offshore wind capacity in Executive Order 14008. Reaching this goal would result in 30 Gigawatts (GW) of offshore wind capacity. Developing offshore wind energy will help states reach their clean and renewable energy goals as many sates on the coast do not have large wind energy resources on land. Since the issuance of Executive Order 14008, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has taken several steps towards reaching that goal.

Statutory Authority

Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) (codified at 43 U.S.C. ch. 29), passed in 1953, the Secretary of the Interior is charged with the administration of mineral exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The OCS is defined as “all submerged lands lying seaward of state coastal waters (3 miles offshore) which are under U.S. jurisdiction.”

In the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), Congress created the OCS Renewable Energy Program to be administered by the DOI. Under this authority, the DOI in 2009 promulgated regulations for leases, easements, and rights-of-way for renewable energy development in the OCS. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), under the DOI, is the agency tasked with overseeing the renewable energy development program.

Regulatory Authority

The BOEM renewable energy development program is broken into four steps: (1) planning, (2) leasing, (3), site assessment, and (4) construction and operations. During the first step, BOEM identifies Wind Energy Areas (WEAs) which are “locations that appear most suitable for wind energy development.” After WEAs have been identified, BOEM issues a public notice to gauge the interest in leasing land in the WEA. Depending on the interest received from BOEM, leasing is done through either a competitive or noncompetitive leasing process.

After leasing is completed, the lessee must submit a Site Assessment Plan (SAP) to BOEM. The purpose of the SAP is for the lessee to provide documentation so that BOEM can evaluate whether the project will comply with applicable regulations. The agency can either approve, approve with modification, or disapprove the SAP. Finally, the lessee must produce a Construction and Operations Plan (COP). As the name suggests, this submission includes a “detailed plan for the construction and operation of a wind energy project on the lease.” BOEM reviews the COP, including environmental review, and can either approve, approve with modification, or disapprove the COP.

Recent Offshore Wind Developments

In May 2021, the DOI approved the COP for the Vineyard Wind project located near Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket. This is the first large-scale, offshore wind project in the United States. The project will have 800 Megawatt (MW) of energy capacity which is enough to power 400,000 homes and businesses. Construction of the project began in November 2021. One of the first steps in the construction process will be placing two transmission cables to transmit electricity from the Vineyard Wind project to the mainland.

Also in November 2021, the DOI approved the COP for the South Fork Wind making it the second large-scale, offshore wind project in the United States. This project off the coasts of New York and Rhode Island will have a capacity of 130 MW which is enough to power approximately 70,000 homes.

In addition to granting final approval of several projects, BOEM has also taken action in the earlier steps of the OCS renewable energy process. For the Carolina Long Bay WEA, located off the coast of the Carolinas, the BOEM began taking public comments on a proposed lease. In October, BOEM received the COP for the Mayflower Wind project. This project would also be located near Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket and would have an energy capacity of more than 2 GW. If approved, the Mayflower Wind project would be one of the largest offshore wind projects in the United States. BOEM also published a Call for Information and Nominations to gauge commercial interest in wind energy development in the Gulf of Mexico.

BOEM has also taken steps to advance offshore wind in the Pacific Ocean in 2021. In July, BOEM published a Call for Information and Nominations to determine commercial interest in the Morro Bay Call Area East and West Extensions, a portion of the Morro Bay WEA. This WEA is located off the coast of Central California. Finally, BOEM designated the Humboldt WEA off the northern coast of California moving closer to the leasing process in this area.

Despite heavy support from the Biden Administration, offshore wind does face opposition. The commercial fishing industry has emerged as a strong opponent of these projects. The industry is concerned that the turbines will impact fish and hinder access to fishing grounds. The Biden Administration could face legal challenges to offshore wind development, particularly under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), from the fishing industry. One such challenge in Fisheries Survival Fund v. Haaland, 858 F. App’x 371 (D.C. Cir. 2021) has proven unsuccessful for the fishing industry.

While the DOI and BOEM have taken many actions to further develop offshore wind in the United States, much more will have to be done to reach the Biden Administration’s goal of 30 MW of offshore wind capacity by 2030. Nonetheless, offshore wind is an important resource for coastal states looking to decarbonize their energy generation and for reaching the Biden Administration’s decarbonization goals.


Reconsidering Roe: Has the Line of Fetal Viability Moved?

Claire Colby, MJLST Staffer

After the Supreme Court heard arguments in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health on December 1, legal commentatorsbegan to speculate the case could be a vehicle for overturning Roe v. Wade. The Mississippi statute at issue in Dobbs bans nearly all abortions after 15 weeks. In questioning Mississippi Solicitor General Scott Stewart, Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked about the “advancements in medicine” that have changed the lines of viability since the Court last considered a major challenge to Roe with Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. “What has changed in science to show that the viability line is not a real line…?” she asked.

Roe v. Wade was a 1973 landmark decision in which the Supreme Court adopted a trimester framework for abortion. During the first trimester, the Court held that “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgement of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.” The court held that states could adopt regulations “reasonably related to maternal health” for abortions after the first trimester, and held that in the third trimester, upon viability, states may “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgement for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” In 1992, the Court rejected this “rigid trimester” framework in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In Casey, the Court turned to a viability framework and found that pre-viability, states may not prohibit abortion or impose “a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” The Court adopted an “undue burden” standard to determine whether state regulations of pre-viability abortion are unconstitutional.

In Casey, the court defined viability as “the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb.” So when do medical professionals consider a fetus viable? The threshold has moved to earlier in the gestation period since the 1970s, but experts disagree on where to draw the line. According to a journal articlepublished in 2018 in Women’s Health Issues, in 1971, fetal age of approximately 28 weeks was “widely used as the criterion of viability.” The article said that until recently, 24 weeks of gestation was the “widely accepted cutoff for viability in the highest acuity neonatal intensive care units.” According to the article, babies born as early as 22 weeks of gestation had an “overall survival rate of 23%” with “the most aggressive medical management available.” The article rebuked the idea of tying abortion restrictions to viability at all: “Tying abortion provisions to the word viability today is as misguided as it was to tie it to a specific trimester in 1973,” the article stated. “There was no true definition of viability then, and as long as medicine strives to treat every patient uniquely, there will never be one.”

A 2017 practice alert published in the official journal of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defined “periviable” births —births occurring “near the limit of viability” —as births occurring between 20 and 26 weeks gestation.

According to a 2020 New York Times article, determinations on the gestational age at which a baby is likely to survive outside of the womb are “in a complex moment of transition.” Though technology has improved, “even top academic institutions disagree about the right approach to treating 22- and 23-week babies.” The article reported that the University of California, San Francisco “a top-tier, high resource hospital,” is “transparent about its policy of offering only comfort care for babies that are born up to the first day of the 23rd week, down to the hour.”

In June 2020, a baby born at the Children’s Hospital and Clinics of Minnesota set the world record for the world’s most premature baby to survive, the Washington Post reported. He was born at 21 weeks and two days gestation.

Several medical developments help to explain this earlier period of viability.

According to a 2020 Nature article, “the biggest difference to survival came in the early 1990s with surfactant treatment.” Surfactant is a “slippery substance” that prevents airways from collapsing upon exhalation. According to Kaiser, premature babies with underdeveloped lungs often lack the substance. “When premature lungs are treated with surfactant after birth, the infant’s blood oxygen levels usually improve within minutes.”

A 2018 study published by the Journal of the American Medical Association, administering prenatal steroids to mothers between 22 and 25 weeks gestation prior to delivery led to a “significantly higher” survival rate, but “survival without major morbidities remains low at 22 and 23 weeks.”

The Dobbs ruling is not expected until this summer, when the Court tends to release its major decisions. Even if the Court maintains the viability standard set forth in Casey, recent medical advances may warrant more consideration about where to draw this line.


Build Back Better Act: A Request for Transparency of a Clearly Visible Issue

Sara Pistilli, MJLST Staffer

On November 19, 2021, the House of Representatives voted to pass the “Build Back Better Act” which includes several provisions aimed at ever-rising healthcare prices. In trying to combat this concern, Congress included mandatory reporting provisions for pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) who bill Medicare and Medicaid insurance programs. PBMs will be required to provide reports every six months that include data on copays, dispensed drugs, rebates, and total out of pocket spending for patients. Speaker Nancy Pelosi states these provisions are aimed at “providing transparency regarding drug costs in private health plans” but is transparency helpful or even necessary when the effects PBMs have on healthcare costs are well known?

What is a PBM?

PBMs are third-party administrators that manage prescription drug benefits on behalf of both private and public healthcare payers. They have significant power to manipulate the healthcare market by acting as middlemen between payers (insurance companies), drug manufacturers, and dispensers (pharmacies). Originally, PBMs were meant to lower healthcare costs by streamlining transactions and attempting to create fair payment systems for dispensing pharmacies.Instead, PBMs have secretly contributed to increasing healthcare costs by inflating drug costs while concurrently decreasing pharmacy reimbursement rates leading to huge windfall profits for PBMs at the patients’ expense.

How do PBMs make millions in profits each year?

While some patients pay cash for medications, most are covered by Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurers. PBMs are paid by these insurers to determine how much a healthcare plan pays for a medication and in turn, how much the pharmacy gets reimbursed for the dispensed medication. For example, Bob receives a new prescription from his doctor for drug A. The pharmacy buys a bottle of drug A for $7. When Bob comes to pick up his prescription for drug A, his health insurer’s PBM pays $8 to reimburse the pharmacy, allowing them to gain a profit of $1. Concurrently, the PBM bills the health insurer $18 for the price of drug A, allowing them to make $10 in profit on Bob’s prescription. This practice, called spread pricing, results in PBMs making millions of dollars in profits each year.

BBBPicture1

Picture: “The Secret Drug Pricing System Middlemen Use to Rake in Millions

How does PBM spread pricing increase healthcare costs for patients?

PBM spread pricing affects healthcare costs in two distinct ways: increased insurance premiums and decreased access to care. As PBMs continue to inflate the cost of prescription drugs, insurers are billed more and more by their PBMs. These expenses directly fall on the shoulders of the government and the healthcare companies, who represent the public and private payer sector. In turn, to keep up with increased billing, public and private payers turn to their beneficiaries to help them pay the PBMs via increased healthcare plan premiums, decreased coverage, and larger copays. Concurrently, as the PBMs reimburse pharmacies less and less for medication dispensing, pharmacies, especially independent ones, try to operate on thinner profit margins. Over time, the low reimbursement rates culminate in decreased clinical services or, in the worst case, pharmacies closing permanently.

What does the Build Back Better Act do to help?

Egregious billing practices by PBMs have been in the spotlight for several years now. In 2018, Ohio’s Department of Medicaid released a report showing that PBMs charged the state of Ohio $224 million in hidden spread pricing. The audit results led to Ohio terminating all PBM contracts with the Department of Medicaid and converting to a single-PBM system where spread pricing could be monitored better. Another report, this time in Utah, showed that PBM’s received $1.5 million from spread pricing in 2018. Similarly in 2019, a Kentucky report found that PBMs retained $123 million in spread pricing in that state. Several states have enacted laws targeting PBM spread pricing as the federal government continues to skirt around the issue. For example, Louisiana prohibits all PBMs from using spread pricing unless a PBM provides written notice of the practice to the health insurer and the policy holder. Louisiana also enacted a law stating that PBMs could not reimburse pharmacies at a lower rate than they do their affiliated pharmacies. This directly targets suspicions that CVS Caremark reimburses CVS pharmacies more to eliminate competition and steer patients towards filling their medications at CVS pharmacies. Like Louisiana, Maine enacted a law stating that PBMs could not participate in spread pricing without proper notice to the state. On October 1st, 2021, North Carolina’s Senate Bill 257 will take effect. This bill requires PBMs to apply for business licenses with the Commissioner of the Department of Insurance, subjecting them to more spread pricing regulations and threats of restitution to pharmacies they reimburse unfairly. While the states’ efforts are not perfect solutions, they are necessary efforts to regulate PBMs more. The federal government’s efforts to increase transparency is unnecessary due to the public recognition of PBM spread pricing. Every state audit that shows gross spread pricing is transparent enough to alert the federal government that PBMs pose a widespread problem to our healthcare system without greater restrictions. PBMs need to be controlled directly through regulations targeted towards preventing and prohibiting spread pricing, rather than asked to report every six months just how much they profit off their deceptive billing practices.