EPA

Carbon Copy Critters: Cloned Species and the Endangered Species Act

February 28, 2021
Animal Law, Endangered Species Act, Environment, Environmental Law, EPA

Emily Kennedy, MJLST Staffer

The United States is home to over 1,600 species listed as threatened or endangered. These species face a number of challenges arising from human activity, such as habitat loss from encroaching human populations, pollution, climate change, and excessive hunting. While species such as the Houston toad or the Government Canyon bat cave Spider may seem insignificant, and perhaps a bit frightening, each species is an important part of an intricately connected biotic community. Losing a few species could trigger an “extinction domino effect” that results in ecosystem fragility and the loss of more and more species. The Endangered Species Act was designed to protect species and their ecosystems. While the Act did not contemplate cloning of endangered species, cloned animals are also protected.

The black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes), a small mammal that historically inhabited the United States’ western mountain prairie region, is among the species listed as endangered. Black-footed ferrets were nearly wiped out entirely as a result of human efforts to kill them to ensure that prairie ranges were better suited for cattle. In fact, they were thought to be extinct until they were rediscovered and scientists captured the remaining animals for a captive breeding program.

Scientists recently announced the birth of Elizabeth Ann, a black-footed ferret who is the first clone of an endangered species indigenous to the United States. Born to a domestic ferret surrogate, she was cloned from a wild black-footed ferret named Willa who died and was frozen in 1988. After her death, Willa’s tissues were sent to a “frozen zoo” that retains genetic materials for over 1,000 species. Viagen, the company that cloned Elizabeth, also recently cloned an endangered Mongolian horse and will clone pet cats and dogs for a hefty fee of $35,000 to $50,000. Elizabeth and any future clone siblings will remain in the possession of scientists for study, with no plans for release into the wild.

The Endangered Species Act was signed into law in 1973 to protect the plant and animal species threatened with extinction in the United States. One commentator has argued that an “aggressive federal governmental policy of cloning endangered animal species would be consistent with the language and spirit of the Endangered Species Act as interpreted by the courts.” Additionally, “lack of genetic diversity in species revived in the laboratory should not preclude [Endangered Species Act] listing.” This was the case with the listing of a plant known as the Franciscan manzanita. Much like the black-footed ferret, the Franciscan manzanita was thought to be extinct until a single plant was discovered. Genetically identical clones were then propagated from cuttings from that plant.

Cloning is a cutting-edge and high-tech practice, but that does not mean that it is a panacea for species extinction concerns. Firstly, the process of cloning wild animals is successful only around 1% of the time. But the primary problem is that many species succumb to extinction due to habitat loss or fragmentation. Cloning does nothing to solve this issue, since cloned animals will still lack the habitat they need to thrive.

Further, genetic diversity is already a concern for many endangered and threatened species. Because they were nearly wiped out as a species before they rebounded in a captive breeding program, black-footed ferrets, like the one Elizabeth was cloned from, descend from seven closely related individuals. Such genetic homogeneity results in increased susceptibility to some diseases. Currently, cloning does not address this concern and may even exacerbate it, by relying on genetic material from even fewer individuals. However, some hope that manipulating the genome to improve genetic resistance is a “possibility in the future.”

While cloning may not be a complete solution to increasing species extinction, some think that it is a useful tool to address the complex problem of extinction in conjunction with other measures. Perhaps in the future, cloning can offer a high-tech option that works in concert with more established methods such as habitat restoration and conservation, captive breeding programs, and measures to address climate change.

Regulatory agencies spring into action after Supreme Court decides dusky gopher frog case

November 7, 2020
Climate Change, Environment, Environmental Justice, Environmental Law, EPA

Emily Newman, MJLST Staffer

While “critical habitat” is defined within the Endangered Species Act (ESA), a definition for “habitat” has never been adopted within the statute itself or any regulations issued by the two agencies responsible for implementing the ESA, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (collectively, the “Services”). In 2018, however, the U.S. Supreme Court called this gap into question. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018). In Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Court reviewed a case by which the USFWS designated a particular area of land as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog, including private property and land that was currently unoccupied by the frog. Id. at 366. Weyerhaeuser Company, a timber company, and a group of family landowners challenged the designation because the land was not currently occupied by this species and would need to be improved before occupation could actually occur. Id. at 367. The Court vacated and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit, determining that the land first must be designated as “habitat” before being designated as “critical habitat.” Id. at 369. More specifically, they remanded to the Fifth Circuit for it to interpret the meaning of “habitat” under the ESA; however, they did not specifically direct the Services to adopt a definition. Id. The Fifth Circuit ended up dismissing the case upon remand.

The Services’ proposed new rule aims to address this gap. The proposed rule was published on August 5, 2020, and within it, the Services propose two alternative definitions for the meaning of “habitat” which would be added to § 424.02 of the ESA. The first definition is as follows: “The physical places that individuals of a species depend upon to carry out one or more life processes. Habitat includes areas with existing attributes that have the capacity to support individuals of the species.” The alternative definition of “habitat” is listed as: “The physical places that individuals of a species use to carry out one or more life processes. Habitat includes areas where individuals of the species do not presently exist but have the capacity to support such individuals, only where the necessary attributes to support the species presently exist.”

The first definition emphasizes “dependence” while the second emphasizes “use”, but both allow for unoccupied areas to be included in the definition. Additionally, both definitions imply that the land has to be suitable for a particular species in its current condition with no improvements made. The Services clarified that the proposed rule would only be prospective and would not revise any designations of critical habitat already made.

The Services issued the proposed rule largely in order to respond to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Weyerhaeuser, but the Services do mention additional purposes such as the desire to “provide transparency, clarity, and consistency for stakeholders.” The proposed rule is also meant to build upon regulatory reforms issued by the Services in 2019. Additionally, the Services place the proposed rule in a larger context as part of the efforts of the Trump administration to “bring the ESA into the 21st century.”

The proposed rule has received both support and criticism. Those in support of the rule mainly highlight how defining “habitat” would lead to more certainty as to when a particular area would or could be protected under the ESA. They say that this could positively impact species by “aiding the public’s understanding of those areas that constitute habitat” and also by helping companies plan out projects in such a way as to minimize any impact on habitat.

Those against the two definitions contained in the proposed rule have multiple reasons for their criticism. For one, they believe that the primary definition in particular runs the risk of conflating “habitat” and “critical habitat” even though “habitat” presumably should cover a wider area. Second, they argue that defining “habitat” through a regulation is unnecessary and has not been necessary in the 45 plus years that the ESA has been around. This is because defining “habitat” could undermine any critical habitat designations under the ESA, and it would also negatively impact or cause confusion in other parts of the ESA where the word “habitat” is used and other federal statutes that are often “implicated by actions related to listed species.” Third, while the proposed rule is prospective and would not require reevaluations of past critical habitat designations, that does not mean the Services by their own accord won’t reevaluate those designations using the new definition of “habitat.”

The last, and arguably most important, critique of the proposed rule is that either definition has the potential to exclude essential areas of habitat such as fragmented, degraded, or destroyed habitat that would need to be restored, and also habitat that is needed for species whose range will likely fluctuate due to the impacts of climate change. Critics, such as the Southern Environmental Law Center (SELC) and the American Fisheries Society (AFS), argue that this would only maintain the status quo and simply “wouldn’t make sense from a management perspective for species recovery or the legislative perspective intended by Congress in enacting the ESA.” The AFS makes a useful analogy to what would happen if a similar definition applied to polluted waters under the Clean Water Act: “Indeed, if a similar definition was used for polluted waters in the U.S. under the Clean Water Act, we would never have improved water quality by installing treatment systems to remove pollutants, as the definition leaves the only condition as status quo.”

Several opponents of the proposed rule provide their own alternative definitions of habitat or what that definition should include. The Defenders of Wildlife suggest a definition that is consistent with definitions of habitat in academia and with the intent of the ESA, as well as being complementary to but distinct from the definition of “critical habitat” in the ESA: “ ‘Habitat’ is the area or type of site where a species naturally occurs or depends on directly or indirectly to carry out its life processes, or where a species formerly occurred or has the potential to occur and carry out its life processes in the foreseeable future.” Additionally, the AFS advises that any definition of habitat account for areas that may not even “house” the species in question but that are nevertheless important for energy and resource flow; this broader suggestion reflects the move towards “holistic watershed approaches” in fisheries management.

The public comment period for the proposed rule closed on September 4, 2020, but the Services has not yet issued a final rule. Looking ahead, though, the strong opinions both for and against the proposed rule indicate that the Services will most likely face litigation irrespective of what they decide upon in the final rule. Moreover, a change in the Administration following the 2020 election will likely affect the outcome of this regulatory action.

Perpetuating Inequality and Illness Through Environmental Injustice

April 30, 2017
Environment, EPA, Healthcare, Healthcare Reform

Nick Redmond, MJLST Staffer

In Sidney D. Watson’s Lessons from Ferguson and Beyond, published in issue 1 of MJLST’s 18th volume, the author focuses on issues of inherent racial bias in access to health care for African Americans, and how the Affordable Care Act may be able to help. The author “explores the structural, institutional, and interpersonal biases that operate in the health care system and that exacerbate Black/white health disparities.” The article’s focus on health care in particular is a critical component of inequality in the U.S., but it also only briefly touches on another important piece of the disparity puzzle: environmental justice. Conversations about environmental justice have taken place in multiple contexts, and in many ways serve to emphasize the multiple facets of racial disparity in the U.S., including police violence, access to health care, access to education, and other issues which are all influenced by the accessibility and the dangers of our built environment.

Such systemic inequalities can include access to public transportation and competitive employment, but they can also be problems of proximity to coal plants or petroleum refineries or even a lack of proximity to public natural spaces for healthy recreation. Lack of access to safe, clean, and enjoyable public parks, for instance, can serve to exacerbate the prevalence of diabetes and obesity, and even take a toll on the mental health of residents trapped in concrete jungles (which the article refers to as “social determinants” of poor health). Though there is some indication that environmental factors can harm neighborhoods regardless of income, industrial zones and polluted environments tend to lie just around the corner from low-income neighborhoods and disproportionately affect those who live there, primarily communities of color.

Often the result of urban development plans, housing prices, and even exclusionary zoning, issues of environmental justice are an insidious form of inequality that are often on the periphery of our national political conversations, if addressed at all. Indeed, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of Civil rights (established in 1993) has not once made a formal finding of discrimination, despite President Bill Clinton’s executive order which made it the duty of federal agencies to consider environmental justice in their actions. When the primary federal agency tasked with ensuring access to environmental justice appears to be asleep at the wheel, what recourse do communities have? The answer, it seems, is depressingly little.

A high profile example in our current discourse, environmental justice appears to have failed Flint, Michigan, and it seems likely that the issue won’t be resolved any time soon. Other examples like Columbus, Mississippi and Anniston, Alabama, are becoming more and more prevalent at a disturbingly high rate. Impoverished people with little political or legal recourse struggle against the might of the booming natural gas industry and new advances in hydraulic fracturing, and as water runs out these communities will be the first to feel the squeeze of rising food prices and access to the most essential resource on the planet.

At risk of sounding apocalyptic, there is some hope. National groups like the NRDC or the ACLU have long litigated these issues with success, and more local or regional groups like the Minnesota Center for Environmental Advocacy or the Southern Environmental Law Center have made enormous impacts for communities of color and the public at large. But as Sidney Watson states at the end of her article: “[w]e need to talk about race, health, and health care. We need to take action to reduce and eliminate racial inequities in health care.” These same sentiments apply to our built environment and the communities that we have pushed to the periphery to take the brunt of the harmful effects of our dirty technologies and waste. Few people would choose to live near a coal plant; those who are forced to do so are often trapped in an endless cycle of illness, poverty, and segregation.

The Path of Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act

March 19, 2016
Environment, Environmental Law, EPA

Ted Harrington, MJLST Staffer

In 1972, the Clean Water Act set forth a lofty goal—to “[r]estore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.” (33 U.S.C. §1251(a)). Yet, the Clean Water Act only regulates point sources that discharge pollutants into navigable waters (33 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1)). As a result, many forms of water pollution escape federal jurisdiction, most notably, groundwater. This is because CWA regulation depends on how a pollutant reaches navigable water, instead of focusing on the end result. This added constraint is hardly logical when juxtaposed against the stated goal.

For example, if a pollutant is discharged into groundwater, and eventually reaches navigable Water Body B, the CWA does not have the ability to regulate the groundwater. In other terms, if the polluted effluent passes through groundwater, considered a “nonpoint source,” before it reaches Water Body B, no CWA regulation occurs.

To combat this issue, Federal District Courts in Hawai’i, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania have begun adopting the “Conduit Theory” (See Allison Kvien note Volume 16). The conduit theory states that if a body of water (groundwater) simply acts as a conduit, it should be viewed as an extension of the point source from which it is receiving the pollutant. This theory directs its attention to the ultimate result—the pollution of Water Body B. It is only logical that if Water Body B is being polluted, the source should fall under CWA jurisdiction. Why should we leave a source of pollution unregulated simply because the effluent isn’t being directly discharged into a navigable water? As the Court in Rapanos v. United States noted, “The [Clean Water] Act does not forbid the ‘addition of any pollutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ but rather the ‘addition of any pollutant to navigable waters.’”

The issue of groundwater as a pollutant is receiving increasing attention in the courts. In the Northern District of Iowa, a case concerning the discharge of groundwater through tile drains is currently in litigation‑ Board of Water Works v. Sac County Board of Supervisors. This could be an opportunity for Iowa to take one of the first stances on the conduit theory in the 8th Circuit. Stay tuned!

Circumventing EPA Regulations Through Computer Programs

December 16, 2015
Data, Environment, Environmental Law, EPA

Ted Harrington, MJLST Staffer

In September of 2015, it was Volkswagen Group (VW). This December, it was the General Electric Company (GE) finalizing a settlement in the United States District Court in Albany. The use of computer programs or other technology to override, or “cheat,” some type of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation has become seemingly commonplace.

GE uses silicone as part of its manufacturing process, which results in volatile organic compounds and chlorinated hydrocarbons, both hazardous byproducts. The disposal of hazardous materials is closely regulated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Under this act, the EPA has delegated permitting authority to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC). This permitting authority allows the DEC to grant permits for the disposal of hazardous wastes in the form of an NYS Part 373 Permit.

The permit allowed GE to store hazardous waste, operate a landfill, and use two incinerators on-site at its Waterford, NY plant. The permit was originally issued in 1989, and was renewed in 1999. The two incinerators included an “automatic waste feed cutoff system” designed to keep the GE facility in compliance with RCRA and the NYS Part 373 Permit. If the incinerator reached a certain limit, the cutoff system would simply stop feeding more waste.

Between September 2006 and February 2007, the cutoff system was overridden by computer technology, or manually by GE employees, on nearly 2,000 occasions. This resulted in hazardous waste being disposed of in amounts grossly above the limits of the issued permits. In early December, GE quickly settled the claim by paying $2.25 million in civil penalties.

Beyond the extra pollution caused by GE, a broader problem is emerging—in an increasingly technological world, what can be done to prevent companies from skirting regulations using savvy computer programs? With more opportunities than ever to get around regulation using technology, is it even feasible to monitor these companies? It is virtually certain that similar instances will continue to surface, and agencies such as the EPA must be on the forefront of developing preventative technology to slow this trend.

EPA Revises Agricultural Worker Protection Standard, to the Disappointment of Agriculture Industry Groups

November 13, 2015
Administrative Law, Environmental Law, EPA

Jody Ferris, MJLST Staffer

An important development on the regulatory front has some agriculture industry groups shaking their heads. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has released finalized revisions to the 1992 Agricultural Worker Protection Standard on Sept. 28, 2015 (40 CFR 170). These regulations apply to millions of agricultural workers in fields, forests, orchards, and greenhouses across the country. The regulations are meant to enforce the observation of good safety practices in the use of pesticides by agricultural workers.

The changes to the current requirements include:

-a new minimum age requirement that prohibits children under the age of 18 from handling pesticides.

-mandatory posting of no-entry signs on fields that have been recently treated with highly dangerous pesticides.

-whistleblower protections to protect employees who alert authorities to illegal practices.

-increased frequency of employer provided safety training (now required annually, up from the previous requirement of every five years).

-recordkeeping requirements (records of training must be kept for two years, previous requirements did not require any record keeping).

-increased requirements for use of safety equipment, including fit testing and employee training on use of safety equipment. Recordkeeping of completion of safety equipment training and fit testing is also required. The previous requirements did not require any training, formal fit testing, or record keeping.

Agricultural industry groups are unhappy with many of the revisions to the regulations. A coalition including the National Association of Wheat Growers, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the American Seed Trade Association submitted a 14-page comment letter during the public comment period and claim that their comments were not taken under proper consideration in the final revision of the rule. The coalition argued that since the original regulations were introduced in 1992, there have been significant improvements in worker safety and that acute poisoning events have been greatly reduced, thereby eliminating the need for more stringent regulations. In addition, they argue that the EPA has severely underestimated the financial costs that the new requirements place on agricultural producers. Criticism from the Agricultural Retailers Association includes the concern that the new rules will put employers at risk for increased liability without significantly increasing worker safety.

It is currently unclear whether any regulated parties will seek to challenge the revised regulations in court. It also remains unclear precisely how great a burden the new requirements will place on agricultural producers or how much they will improve the safety of workers until they are followed in practice for some time. It remains to be hoped that the new requirements will indeed significantly improve the safety of agricultural workers on the job and justify any increased burden on employers.

Shape Up or Ship Out: E.P.A. Forced to Reevaluate Their General Ballast Water Regulation Permit

October 20, 2015
Environmental Law, EPA, Invasive Species

John Biglow, MJLST Staffer

In the recently decided Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. E.P.A., — F.3d — (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2015), the Second Circuit granted the petitioners’ motion, in part, for a review of the Environmental Protection Agency’s 2013 Vessel General Permit (VGP) regulating the discharge of ballast water from ships. The petitioners, four environmental conservation organizations, argued successfully that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in a number of ways when it set the technology based effluent limits (TBELs) and water quality-based effluent limits (WQBELs) which must be complied with under its VGP. In so deciding, the Second Circuit has remanded the matter to the EPA for proceedings consistent with their opinion, and has kept the 2013 VGP in place until the EPA issues a new VGP.

The EPA has the authority to regulate ballast discharge under §402(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA). When freighter ships take on or unload cargo, they adjust for changes in weight by taking on or discharging ballast water. As the court stated, this amount “can range from hundreds of gallons to as much as 25 million gallons.” The regulation of ballast discharge is an important aspect of environmental conservation due to its role as a conduit for the spread of invasive species and pollutants. When a ship takes on ballast water in a polluted or infested area, it is possible for these organisms and pollutants to get sucked up with the water, surviving in the ballast tanks before being discharged in some distinct body of water. One study referenced by the court estimated the damage from invasive species to be upwards of $137 billion annually, making the prevention of their spread both a top environmental and economic priority.

The first set of arguments made by the petitioners centered on whether the TBELs set by the EPA were arbitrary and capricious. The petitioners first argued that in setting the TBEL standard to mirror the standard adopted by the International Maritime Organization in 2004 (the IMO standard), the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously. The Court agreed, primarily because a higher standard was attainable. The CWA requires the EPA to apply the “best available technology economically achievable” (BAT) when setting their TBELs. In its investigation of the available technology, the EPA employed the Science Advisory Board (SAB) to issue a report on the different available systems. According to their report, there were a number of ballast-water treatment systems that would be able to achieve standards 10 to 100 times greater than the IMO in the near future. By ignoring this potential and instead setting the standard at the IMO, the court found that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously.

Next, the petitioners argued that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it limited the SAB’s investigation of ballast treatment systems to shipboard treatment; ignoring onshore treatment options. The court agreed, refusing arguments from the EPA that these systems were not considered because the facilities needed to implement them were not yet in existence. The court reasoned that the time and expense of creating onshore treatment infrastructure was similar to that required for shipboard treatment, and that it was arbitrary and capricious to ignore the possibility. In remanding this issue back to the EPA, the agency will need to fully consider onshore treatment options before adopting or dismissing them in their new VGP.

The petitioners further argued that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in exempting ships built before 2009 that only sail the great lakes water system (pre-2009 Lakers). The court agreed, reasoning that there was no true distinction between pre- and post-2009 Lakers. The court further stated that exempting ships because they did not currently have the technological capacity to adopt the technology necessary to meet the VGP requirements conflicted with the CWA’s BAT requirement, which seeks to force technology to keep up with contemporary environmental demands.

The petitioners next argued that several facets of the WQBELs were arbitrary and capricious. The WQBELs were designed as a safeguard to be utilized when the TBELs alone are insufficient to meet and maintain water quality standards. In its 2013 VGP, the EPA refused to set numerical values for its WQBELs, instead stating simply that “Your discharge must be controlled as necessary to meet applicable water quality standards in the receiving water body or another water body impacted by your discharges.” The court agreed that setting a narrative WQBEL was arbitrary and capricious, noting that it fails to give ship owners clear guidance as to whether or not they are in compliance with the WQBELs.

The petitioners also argued that the monitoring requirements of the WQBELs was arbitrary and capricious. The 2013 VGP required only that ship owners monitor the expected time, place, and volume of their ballast discharges. The court agreed, reasoning that the EPA could consider requiring ship owners to monitor the actual statistics on their ballast discharges, rather than the expected ones.

It is a critical victory for environmentalists that the Second Circuit is requiring the EPA to revisit what was an incomplete and insufficient 2013 VGP; however, it is critical that the EPA get it right the second time around. The economic and environmental impact of ballast discharges is significant and due to the cost and time requirements involved in creating the infrastructure necessary to meet the VGP system requirements, we are likely to be stuck with whatever the EPA sets as the BAT for a very long time.

Honeybee Protection in the Ninth Circuit

October 13, 2015
Environmental Law, EPA, Food and Agriculture

Ian Blodger, MJLST Note & Comment Editor

In Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S. E.P.A., the Ninth Circuit recently took action to protect honeybees from dangerous chemicals approved by the Environmental Protection Agency. The case is a unique situation because the great deference with which the court reviews the EPA’s pesticide approval decisions means these approvals are rarely overturned.

The EPA has the authority to approve pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). FIFRA allows the EPA to deny approval for pesticide licensing if doing so would prevent unreasonable adverse effects, including risks to the environment. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a). In approving the use of a new pesticide, the EPA may choose to approve the pesticide conditionally or unconditionally. Conditional approval essentially means the EPA has insufficient data to determine the overall effects of the pesticide, and will allow use of the pesticide for a limited time to determine its impacts. Unconditional approval indicates the EPA has sufficient data to know the pesticide’s environmental effects. The court reviews the EPA’s decision to approve a new pesticide “if it is supported by substantial evidence when considered on the record as a whole” 7 U.S.C. § 136n(b).

This specific case centers around three new pesticides for which Dow Agrosciences sought approval. Each of these pesticides contained sulfoxaflor as its main ingredient. Following testing on individual bees, the EPA concluded sulfaxaflor was highly toxic to bees. After completing additional, though limited studies, the EPA concluded that there would be no way to determine the ultimate impact of the pesticide on the honeybee population unless the pesticide underwent testing under real world conditions. As such the EPA initially proposed to conditionally approve the use of sulfaxaflor pesticides while the agency collected additional data.

The EPA then reconsidered its previous conclusion, and decided to grant unconditional approval to the pesticide so long as certain mitigation measures were put in place. The EPA had no evidence as to the effectiveness of these measures.

Looking to this, the court determined that the record as a whole did not support the EPA’s decision to unconditionally approve the three sulfaxaflor based pesticides. The court’s decision rested on the fact that there was no evidence in the record suggesting the mitigation measures were sufficient to protect honeybees. As a result, the court vacated the EPA’s approval of the pesticides, and remanded the case to the EPA for further studies.

While this outcome does not prevent the EPA from conditionally approving sulfaxaflor, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis will hopefully serve as a reminder to agencies tasked with protecting valuable national resources to take their task seriously.

Awaiting an Important Decision on the Gulf of New Mexico “Dead Zone” Lawsuit

September 5, 2015
Environment, Environmental Law, EPA

Allison Kvien, MJLST Managing Editor

In 2013, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was ordered to set limits on nitrogen and phosphorous levels in U.S. waterways. These nutrients contribute to the loss of oxygen and cause what is called hypoxia to occur in the water, killing marine life. This year, the “dead zone” in the Gulf is larger than Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. While this is larger than average, it is not a record. The oxygen levels are so low in this zone that it was reported that even starfish are suffocating.

An appeals court recently decided that the district court should determine, based on the Clean Water Act (CWA), whether the EPA gave adequate reasons for its refusal to set limits on the nutrients in U.S. waterways. Environmental groups, such as the NRDC, are optimistic that the original ruling requiring the EPA to set nutrient limits will be reaffirmed by the district court.

This CWA ruling is analogous to the 2007 Supreme Court Clean Air Act (CAA) case, Massachusetts v. EPA, which ruled that the EPA must have good reasons, based on the CAA, for refusing to regulate greenhouse gases (GHGs). The Supreme Court found that the EPA’s rationale for not regulating GHGs was inadequate and required the EPA to come back with a reasonable basis for not regulating GHGs in order to avoid being forced to regulate GHGs.

If the outcome of this CWA lawsuit is that the EPA is required to regulate nutrients causing the enormous hypoxia zone, the EPA will embark on a hugely collaborative journey to set appropriate limits for these nutrients all over the country. For instance, the NRDC reports that Chicago, over one thousand miles away from the Gulf, was found to be the single largest contributor to the “dead zone” in the Gulf.

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