Privacy

Reconsidering Roe: Has the Line of Fetal Viability Moved?

Claire Colby, MJLST Staffer

After the Supreme Court heard arguments in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health on December 1, legal commentatorsbegan to speculate the case could be a vehicle for overturning Roe v. Wade. The Mississippi statute at issue in Dobbs bans nearly all abortions after 15 weeks. In questioning Mississippi Solicitor General Scott Stewart, Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked about the “advancements in medicine” that have changed the lines of viability since the Court last considered a major challenge to Roe with Planned Parenthood v. Casey in 1992. “What has changed in science to show that the viability line is not a real line…?” she asked.

Roe v. Wade was a 1973 landmark decision in which the Supreme Court adopted a trimester framework for abortion. During the first trimester, the Court held that “the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgement of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.” The court held that states could adopt regulations “reasonably related to maternal health” for abortions after the first trimester, and held that in the third trimester, upon viability, states may “regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical judgement for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” In 1992, the Court rejected this “rigid trimester” framework in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In Casey, the Court turned to a viability framework and found that pre-viability, states may not prohibit abortion or impose “a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.” The Court adopted an “undue burden” standard to determine whether state regulations of pre-viability abortion are unconstitutional.

In Casey, the court defined viability as “the time at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb.” So when do medical professionals consider a fetus viable? The threshold has moved to earlier in the gestation period since the 1970s, but experts disagree on where to draw the line. According to a journal articlepublished in 2018 in Women’s Health Issues, in 1971, fetal age of approximately 28 weeks was “widely used as the criterion of viability.” The article said that until recently, 24 weeks of gestation was the “widely accepted cutoff for viability in the highest acuity neonatal intensive care units.” According to the article, babies born as early as 22 weeks of gestation had an “overall survival rate of 23%” with “the most aggressive medical management available.” The article rebuked the idea of tying abortion restrictions to viability at all: “Tying abortion provisions to the word viability today is as misguided as it was to tie it to a specific trimester in 1973,” the article stated. “There was no true definition of viability then, and as long as medicine strives to treat every patient uniquely, there will never be one.”

A 2017 practice alert published in the official journal of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists defined “periviable” births —births occurring “near the limit of viability” —as births occurring between 20 and 26 weeks gestation.

According to a 2020 New York Times article, determinations on the gestational age at which a baby is likely to survive outside of the womb are “in a complex moment of transition.” Though technology has improved, “even top academic institutions disagree about the right approach to treating 22- and 23-week babies.” The article reported that the University of California, San Francisco “a top-tier, high resource hospital,” is “transparent about its policy of offering only comfort care for babies that are born up to the first day of the 23rd week, down to the hour.”

In June 2020, a baby born at the Children’s Hospital and Clinics of Minnesota set the world record for the world’s most premature baby to survive, the Washington Post reported. He was born at 21 weeks and two days gestation.

Several medical developments help to explain this earlier period of viability.

According to a 2020 Nature article, “the biggest difference to survival came in the early 1990s with surfactant treatment.” Surfactant is a “slippery substance” that prevents airways from collapsing upon exhalation. According to Kaiser, premature babies with underdeveloped lungs often lack the substance. “When premature lungs are treated with surfactant after birth, the infant’s blood oxygen levels usually improve within minutes.”

A 2018 study published by the Journal of the American Medical Association, administering prenatal steroids to mothers between 22 and 25 weeks gestation prior to delivery led to a “significantly higher” survival rate, but “survival without major morbidities remains low at 22 and 23 weeks.”

The Dobbs ruling is not expected until this summer, when the Court tends to release its major decisions. Even if the Court maintains the viability standard set forth in Casey, recent medical advances may warrant more consideration about where to draw this line.


TikTok Settles in Class Action Data Privacy Lawsuit – Will Pay $92 Million Settlement

Sarah Nelson, MJLST Staffer

On November 15, 2021, TikTok users received the following notification within the app: “Class Action Settlement Notice: U.S. residents who used Tik Tok before 01 OCT 2021 may be eligible for a class settlement payment – visit https://www.TikTokDataPrivacySettlement.com for details.” The notification was immediately met with skepticism, with users taking to Twitter and TikTok itself to joke about how the notification was likely a scam. However, for those familiar with TikTok’s litigation track record on data privacy, this settlement does not come as a surprise. Specifically, in 2019, TikTok – then known as Musical.ly – settled with the Federal Trade Commission over alleged violations of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act for $5.7 million. This new settlement is notable for the size of the payout and for what it tells us about the current state of data privacy and biometric data law in the United States.

Allegations in the Class Action

21 federal lawsuits against TikTok were consolidated into one class action to be overseen by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. All of the named plaintiffs in the class action are from either Illinois or California and many are minors. The class action comprises two classes – one class covers TikTok users nationwide and the other only includes Tik Tok users who are residents of Illinois.

In the suit, plaintiffs allege TikTok improperly used their personal data. This improper use includes accusations that TikTok, without consent, shared consumer data with third parties. These third parties allegedly include companies based in China, as well as well-known companies in the United States like Google and Facebook. The class action also accuses TikTok of unlawfully using facial recognition technology and of harvesting data from draft videos – videos that users made but never officially posted. Finally, plaintiffs allege TikTok actively took steps to conceal these practices.

What State and Federal Laws Were Allegedly Violated?

On the federal law level, plaintiffs allege TikTok violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). As the name suggests, the CFAA was enacted to combat computer fraud and prohibits accessing “protected computers” in the absence of authorization or beyond the scope of authorization. Here, the plaintiff-users allege TikTok went beyond the scope of authorization by secretly transmitting personal data, “including User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private Videos and Private Video Images never intended for public consumption.” As for the VPPA, the count alleges the Act was violated when TikTok gave “personally identifiable information” to Facebook and Google. TikTok allegedly provided Facebook and Google with information about what videos a TikTok user had watched and liked, and what TikTok content creators a user had followed.

On the state level, the entire class alleged violations of the California Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act and a Violation of the Right to Privacy under the California Constitution. Interestingly, the plaintiffs within the Illinois subclasswere able to allege violations under the Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). Under the BIPA, before collecting user biometric information, companies must inform the consumer in writing that the information is being collected and why. The company must also say how long the information will be stored and get the consumer to sign off on the collection. The complaint alleges TikTok did not provide the required notice or receive the required written consent.

Additionally, plaintiffs allege intrusion upon seclusion, unjust enrichment, and violation of both a California unfair competition law and a California false advertising law.

In settling the class action, TikTok denies any wrongdoing and maintains that this settlement is only to avoid the cost of further litigation. TikTok gave the following statement to the outlet Insider: “While we disagree with the assertions, we are pleased to have reached a settlement agreement that allows us to move forward and continue building a safe and joyful experience for the TikTok community.”

Terms of the Settlement

To be eligible for a settlement payment, a TikTok user must be a United States resident and must have used the app prior to October of 2021. If an individual meets these criteria, they must submit a claim before March 1, 2022. 89 million usersare estimated to be eligible to receive payment. However, members of the Illinois subclass are eligible to receive six shares of the settlement, as compared to the one share the nationwide class is eligible for. This difference is due to the added protection the Illinois subclass has from BIPA.

In addition to the payout, the settlement will require TikTok to revise its practices. Under the agreed upon settlement reforms, TikTok will no longer mine data from draft videos, collect user biometric data unless specified in the user agreement, or use GPS data to track user location unless specified in the user agreement. TikTok also said they would no longer send or store user data outside of the United States.

All of the above settlement terms are subject to final approval by the U.S. District Judge.

Conclusion

The lawyers representing TikTok users remarked that this settlement was “among the largest privacy-related payouts in history.” And, as noted by NPR, this settlement is similar to the one agreed to by Facebook in 2020 for $650 million. It is possible the size of these settlements will contribute to technology companies preemptively searching out and ceasing practices that may be privacy violative

It is also worth noting the added protection extended to residents of Illinois because of BIPA and its private right of actionthat can be utilized even where there has not been a data breach.

Users of the TikTok app often muse about how amazingly curated their “For You Page” – the videos that appear when you open the app and scroll without doing any particular search – seem to be. For this reason, even with potential privacy concerns, the app is hard to give up. Hopefully, users can rest a bit easier now knowing TikTok has agreed to the settlement reforms.


The StingRay You’ve Never Heard of: How One of the Most Effective Tools in Law Enforcement Operates Behind a Veil of Secrecy

Dan O’Dea, MJLST Staffer

One of the most effective investigatory tools in law enforcement has operated behind a veil of secrecy for over 15 years. “StingRay” cell phone tower simulators are used by law enforcement agencies to locate and apprehend violent offenders, track persons of interest, monitor crowds when intelligence suggests threats, and intercept signals that could activate devices. When passively operating, StingRays mimic cell phone towers, forcing all nearby cell phones to connect to them, while extracting data in the form of metadata calls, text messages, internet traffic, and location information, even when a connected phone is powered off. They can also inject spying software into phones and prevent phones from accessing cellular data. StingRays were initially used overseas by federal law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, before spreading into the hands of the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security, and now are actively used by local law enforcement agencies in 27 states to solve everything from missing persons cases to thefts of chicken wings.

The use of StingRay devices is highly controversial due to their intrusive nature. Not only does the use of StingRays raise privacy concerns, but tricking phones into connecting to StingRays mimicking cell phone towers prevent accessing legitimate cell phone service towers, which can obstruct access to 911 and other emergency hotlines. Perplexingly, the use of StingRay technology by law enforcement is almost entirely unregulated. Local law enforcement agencies frequently cite secrecy agreements with the FBI and the need to protect an investigatory tool as a means of denying the public information about how StingRays operate, and criminal defense attorneys have almost no means of challenging their use without this information. While the Department of Justice now requires federal agents obtain a warrant to use StingRay technology in criminal cases, an exception is made for matters relating to national security, and the technology may have been used to spy on racial-justice protestors during the Summer of 2020 under this exception. Local law enforcement agencies are almost completely unrestricted in their use of StingRays, and may even conceal their use in criminal prosecutions by tagging their findings as those of a “confidential source,” rather than admitting the use of a controversial investigatory tool. Doing so allows prosecutors to avoid  battling 4th amendment arguments characterizing data obtained by StingRays as unlawful search and seizure.

After existing in a “legal no-man’s land” since the technology’s inception, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative Ted Lieu (D-HI) sought to put an end to the secrecy of StingRays through introducing the Cell-Site Simulator Warrant Act of 2021 in June of 2021. The bill would have mandated that law enforcement agencies obtain a warrant to investigate criminal activity before deploying StingRay technology while also requiring law enforcement agencies to delete data of phones other than those of investigative targets. Further, the legislation would have required agencies to demonstrate a need to use StingRay technology that outweighs any potential harm to the community impacted by the technology. Finally, the bill would have limited authorized use of StingRay technology to the minimum amount of time necessary to conduct an investigation. However, the Cell-Site Simulator Warrant Act of 2021 appears to have died in committee after failing to garner significant legislative support.

Ultimately, no device with the intrusive capabilities of StingRays should be allowed to operate free from the constraints of regulation. While StingRays are among the most effective tools utilized by law enforcement, they are also among the most intrusive into the privacy of the general public. It logically follows that agencies seeking to operate StingRays should be required to make a showing of a need to utilize such an intrusive investigatory tool. In certain situations, it may be easy to establish the need to deploy a StingRay, such as doing so to further the investigation of a missing persons case. In others, law enforcement agencies would correctly find their hands tied should they wish to utilize a StingRay to catch a chicken wing thief.


Whitelist for Thee, but Not for Me: Facebook File Scandals and Section 230 Solutions

Warren Sexson, MJLST Staffer

When I was in 7th grade, I convinced my parents to let me get my first social media account. Back in the stone age, that phrase was synonymous with Facebook. I never thought too much of how growing up in the digital age affected me, but looking back, it is easy to see the cultural red flags. It came as no surprise to me when, this fall, the Wall Street Journal broke what has been dubbed “The Facebook Files,” and in them found an internal study from the company showing Instagram is toxic to teen girls. While tragic, this conclusion is something many Gen-Zers and late-Millennials have known for years. However, in the “Facebook Files” there is another, perhaps even more jarring, finding: Facebook exempts many celebrities and elite influencers from its rules of conduct. This revelation demands a discussion of the legal troubles the company may find itself in and the proposed solutions to the “whitelisting” problem.

The Wall Street Journal’s reporting describes an internal process by Facebook called “whitelisting” in which the company “exempted high-profile users from some or all of its rules, according to company documents . . . .” This includes individuals from a wide range of industries and political viewpoints, from Soccer mega star Neymar, to Elizabeth Warren, and Donald Trump (prior to January 6th). The practice put the tech giant in legal jeopardy after a whistleblower, later identified as Frances Haugen, submitted a whistleblower complaint with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that Facebook has “violated U.S. securities laws by making material misrepresentations and omissions in statements to investors and prospective investors . . . .” See 17 CFR § 240.14a-9 (enforcement provision on false or misleading statements to investors). Mark Zuckerberg himself has made statements regarding Facebook’s neutral application of standards that are at direct odds with the Facebook Files. Regardless of the potential SEC investigation, the whitelist has opened up the conversation regarding the need for serious reform in the big tech arena to make sure no company can make lists of privileged users again. All of the potential solutions deal with 47 U.S.C. § 230, known colloquially as “section 230.”

Section 230 allows big tech companies to censor content while still being treated as a platform instead of a publisher (where they would incur liability for what is on their website). Specifically, § 230(c)(2)(A) provides that no “interactive computer service” shall be held liable for taking action in good faith to restrict “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable [content] . . . .” It is the last phrase, “otherwise objectionable,” that tech companies have used as justification for removing “hate speech” or “misinformation” from their platform without incurring publisher like liability. The desire to police such speech has led Facebook to develop stringent platform rules which has in turn created the need for whitelisting. This brings us to our first proposal, eliminating the phrase “otherwise objectionable” from section 230 itself. The proposed “Stop the Censorship Act of 2020” brought by Republican Paul Gosar of Arizona does just that. Proponents argue that it would force tech companies to be neutral or lose liability protections. Thus, no big tech company would ever create standards stringent enough to require a “whitelist” or an exempted class, because the standard is near to First Amendment protections—problem solved! However, the current governing majority has serious concerns about forced neutrality, which would ignore problems of misinformation or the mental health effects of social media in the aftermath of January 6th.

Elizabeth Warren, similar to a recent proposal in the House Judiciary Committee, takes a different approach: breaking up big tech. Warren proposes passing legislation to limit big tech companies in competing with small businesses who use the platform and reversing/blocking mergers, such as Facebook purchasing Instagram. Her plan doesn’t necessarily stop companies from having whitelists, but it does limit the power held by Facebook and others which could in turn, make them think twice before unevenly applying the rules. Furthermore, Warren has called for regulators to use “every tool in the toolbox,” in regard to Facebook.

Third, some have claimed that Google, Facebook, and Twitter have crossed the line under existing legal doctrines to become state actors. So, the argument goes, government cannot “induce” or “encourage” private persons to do what the government cannot. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973). Since some in Congress have warned big tech executives to restrict what they see as bad content, the government has essentially co-opted the hand of industry to block out constitutionally protected speech. See Railway Employee’s Department v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (finding state action despite no actual mandate by the government for action). If the Supreme Court were to adopt this reasoning, Facebook may be forced to adopt a First Amendment centric approach since the current hate speech and misinformation rules would be state action; whitelists would no longer be needed since companies would be blocked from policing fringe content. Finally, the perfect solution! The Court can act where Congress cannot agree. I am skeptical of this approach—needless to say, such a monumental decision would completely shift the nature of social media. While Justice Thomas has hinted at his openness to this argument, it is unclear if the other justices will follow suit.

All in all, Congress and the Court have tools at their disposal to combat the disturbing actions taken by Facebook. Outside of potential SEC violations, Section 230 is a complicated but necessary issue Congress must confront in the coming months. “The Facebook Files” have exposed the need for systemic change in social media. What I once used to use to play Farmville, has become a machine that has rules for me, but not for thee.


Privacy, Public Facebook Posts, and the Medicalization of Everything

Peter J. Teravskis, MD/JD Candidate, MJLST Staffer

Medicalization is “a process by which human problems come to be defined and treated as medical problems.” Medicalization is not a formalized process, but is instead “a social meaning embedded within other social meanings.” As the medical domain has expanded in recent years scholars have begun to point to problems with “over-medicalization” or “corrupted medicalization.” Specifically, medicalization is used to describe “the expansion of medicine in people’s lives.” For example, scholars have problematized the medicalization of obesity, shynesshousing, poverty, normal aging, and even dying, amongst many others. The process of medicalization has become so pervasive in recent years that various sociologists have begun to discuss it as the medicalization “of everyday life,” “of society,”  “of culture,” of the human condition, and “the medicalization of everything”—i.e. turning all human difference into pathology. Similarly, developments in “technoscientific biomedicine” have led scholars to blur the line of what is exclusively “medical” into a broader process of “biomedicalization.”

Medicalization does not carry a valence of “good” or “bad” per se: medicalization and demedicalization can both restrict and expand personal liberties. However, when everyday living is medicalized there are many attendant problems. First, medicalization places problems outside a person’s control: rather than the result of choice, personality, or character, a medicalized problem is considered biologically preordained or “curable.” Medicalized human differences are no longer considered normal; therefore, “treatment” becomes a “foregone conclusion.” Because of this, companies are incentivized to create pharmacological and biotechnological solutions to “cure” the medicalized problem. From a legal perspective, Professor Adele E. Clarke and colleagues note that through medicalization, “social problems deemed morally problematic . . . [are] moved from the professional jurisdiction of the law to that of medicine.” This process is referred to, generally, as the “medicalization of deviance.” Further, medicalization can de-normalize aspects of the human condition and classify people as “diseased.”

Medicalization is important to the sociological study of social control. Social control is defined as the “mechanisms, in the form of patterns of pressure, through which society maintains social order and cohesion.” Thus, once medicalized, an illness is subject to control by medicinal interventions (drugs, surgery, therapy, etc.) and a sick people are expected to take on the “sick role” whereby they become the subjects of physicians’ professional control. A recent example of medical social control is the social pressure to engage in hygienic habits, precautionary measures, and “social distancing” in response to the novel coronavirus, COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic is an expressly medical problem; however, when normal life, rather than a viral outbreak, is medicalized, medical social control becomes problematic. For example, the sociologist Peter Conrad argues that medical social control can take the form of “medical surveillance.” He states that “this form of medical social control suggests that certain conditions or behaviors become perceived through a ‘medical gaze’ and that physicians may legitimately lay claim to all activities concerning the condition” (quoting Michel Foucault’s seminal book The Birth of the Clinic).

The effects of medical social control are amplified due to the communal nature of medicine and healthcare, leading to “medical­legal hybrid[]” social control and, I argue, medical-corporate social control. For example, employers and insurers have interests in encouraging healthful behavior when it reduces members’ health care costs. Similarly, employers are interested in maximizing healthy working days, decreasing worker turnover, and maximizing healthy years, thus expanding the workforce. The State has similar interests, as well as interests in reducing end-of-life and old age medical costs. At first glance, this would seem to militate against overmedicalization. However, modern epidemiological methods have revealed the long term consequences of untreated medical problems. Thus, medicalization may result in the diversion of health care dollars towards less expensive preventative interventions and away from more expensive therapy that would help later in life.

An illustrative example is the medicalization of obesity. Historically, obesity was not considered a disease but was a socially desirable condition: demonstrating wealth; the ability to afford expensive, energy-dense foods; and a life of leisure rather than manual labor. Changing social norms, increased life expectancy, highly sensitive biomedical technologies for identifying subtle metabolic changes in blood chemistry, and population-level associations between obesity and later-life health complications have contributed to the medicalization of this conditions. Obesity, unlike many other conditions, it not attributable to a single biological process, rather, it is hypothesized to result from the contribution of multiple genetic and environmental factors. As such, there is no “silver bullet” treatment for obesity. Instead, “treatment” for obesity requires profound changes reaching deep into how a patient lives her life. Many of these interventions have profound psychosocial implications. Medicalized obesity has led, in part, to the stigmatization of people with obesity. Further, medical recommendations for the treatment of obesity, including gym membership, and expensive “health” foods, are costly for the individual.

Because medicalized problems are considered social problems affecting whole communities, governments and employers have stepped in to treat the problem. Politically, the so-called “obesity epidemic” has led to myriad policy changes and proposals. Restrictions designed to combat the obesity epidemic have included taxes, bans, and advertising restrictions on energy-dense food products. On the other hand, states and the federal government have implemented proactive measures to address obesity, for example public funds have been allocated to encourage access to and awareness of “healthy foods,” and healthy habits. Further, Social Security Disability, Medicare and Medicaid, and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program have been modified to cope with economic and health effects of obesity.

Other tools of control are available to employers and insurance providers. Most punitively, corporate insurance plans can increase rates for obese employees.  As Abby Ellin, writing for Observer, explained “[p]enalizing employees for pounds is perfectly legal [under the Affordable Care Act]” (citing a policy brief published in the HealthAffairs journal). Alternatively, employers and insurers have paid for or provided incentives for gym memberships and use, some going so far as to provide exercise facilities in the workplace. Similarly, some employers have sought to modify employee food choices by providing or restricting food options available in the office. The development of wearable computer technologies has presented another option for enforcing obesity-focused behavioral control. Employer-provided FitBits are “an increasingly valuable source of workforce health intelligence for employers and insurance companies.” In fact, Apple advertises Apple Watch to corporate wellness divisions and various media outlets have noted how Apple Watch and iPhone applications can be used by employers for health surveillance.

Indeed, medicalization as a pretense for technological surveillance and social control is not exclusively used in the context of obesity prevention. For instance, the medicalization of old age has coincided with the technological surveillance of older people. Most troubling, medicalization in concert with other social forces have spawned an emerging field of technological surveillance of mental illness. Multiple studies, and current NIH-funded research, are aimed at developing algorithms for the diagnosis of mental illness based on data mined from publicly accessible social media and internet forum posts. This process is called “social media analysis.” These technologies are actively medicalizing the content of digital communications. They subject peoples’ social media postings to an algorithmic imitation of the medical gaze, whereby, “physicians may legitimately lay claim to” those social media interactions.  If social media analysis performs as hypothesized, certain combinations of words and phrases will constitute evidence of disease. Similar technology has already been coopted as a mechanism of social control to detect potential perpetrators of mass shootings. Policy makers have already seized upon the promise of medical social media analysis as a means to enforce “red flag” laws. Red flag laws “authorize courts to issue a special type of protection order, allowing the police to temporarily confiscate firearms from people who are deemed by a judge to be a danger to themselves or to others.” Similarly, it is conceivable that this type of evidence will be used in civil commitment proceedings. If implemented, such programs would constitute a link by which medical surveillance, under the banner of medicalization, could be used as grounds to deprive individuals of civil liberty, demonstrating an explicit medical-legal hybrid social control mechanism.

What protections does the law offer? The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches. To determine whether a “search” has occurred courts ask whether the individual has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the contents of the search. Therefore, whether a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in publicly available social media data is critical to determining whether that data can be used in civil commitment proceedings or for red flag law protective orders.

Public social media data is, obviously, public, so courts have generally held that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. By contrast, the Supreme Court has ruled that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data contained on their cell phones and personal computers, as well as their personal location data (cell-site location information) legally collected by third party cell service providers. Therefore, it is an open question how far a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy extends in the case of digital information. Specifically, when public social media data is used for medical surveillance and making psychological diagnoses the legal calculation may change. One interpretation of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test argues that it is an objective test—asking whether a reasonable person would actually have a privacy interest. Indeed, some scholars have suggested using polling data to define the perimeter of Fourth Amendment protections. In that vein, an analysis of the American Psychiatric Association’s “Goldwater Rule” is illustrative.

The Goldwater Rule emerged after the media outlet “Fact” published psychiatrists’ medical impressions of 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. Goldwater filed a libel suit against Fact, and the jury awarded him $1.00 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive damages resulting from the publication of the psychiatric evaluations. None of the quoted psychiatrists had met or examined Goldwater in person. Subsequently, concerned primarily about the inaccuracies of “diagnoses at a distance,” the APA adopted the Goldwater Rule, prohibiting psychiatrists from engaging in such practices. It is still in effect today.

The Goldwater Rule does not speak to privacy per se, but it does speak to the importance of personal, medical relationships between psychiatrists and patients when arriving at a diagnosis. Courts generally treat those types of relationships as private and protect them from needless public exposure. Further, using social media surveillance to diagnose mental illness is precisely the type of diagnosis-at-a-distance that concerns the APA. However, big-data techniques promise to obviate the diagnostic inaccuracies the 1960s APA was concerned with.

The jury verdict in favor of Goldwater is more instructive. While the jury found only nominal compensatory damages, it nevertheless chose to punish Fact magazine. This suggests that the jury took great umbrage with the publication of psychiatric diagnoses, even though they were obtained from publicly available data. Could this be because psychiatric diagnoses are private? The Second Circuit, upholding the jury verdict, noted that running roughshod over privacy interests is indicative of malice in cases of libel. Under an objective test, this seems to suggest that subjecting public information to the medical gaze, especially the psychiatrist’s gaze, unveils information that is private. In essence, applying big-data computer science techniques to public posts unveils or reveals private information contained in the publicly available words themselves. Even though the public social media posts are not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, a psychiatric diagnosis based on those words may be objectively private. In sum, the medicalization and medical surveillance of normal interactions on social media may create a Fourth Amendment privacy interest where none previously existed.


“Open up it’s the police! . . . And Jeff Bezos?”

Noah Cozad, MJLST Staffer

Amazon’s Ring company posted a series of Instagram posts around Halloween, including a video of children trick or treating, and statistics about how many doorbells were rang on the night.  What was probably conceived as a cute marketing idea, quickly received backlash. It turns out people were not enamored by the thought of Ring watching their children trick or treat.  This is not the first time Ring’s ads have drawn criticism. In June of this year, social media users noticed that Ring was using images and footage from their cameras in advertisements. The posts included pictures of suspects, as well as details of their alleged crimes. Ring called these “Community Alerts.” Customers, it seems, have agreed to exactly this use of data. In Ring’s terms of service agreement, customers grant Ring the ability to “use, distribute, store .  . . and create derivative works from such Content that you share through our Service.”

The backlash to Ring’s ads gets to a deeper concern about the Amazon company and its technology: the creation of a massive, privately owned surveillance network. Consumers have good reason to be wary of this. It’s not fully understood what exactly Ring does with the images and videos this network creates. Earlier this year, it was reported that Ring allegedly gave their Ukrainian R&D team unlimited access to every video and image created by any Ring camera. And Ring allegedly allowed engineers and executives unlimited access to some customers cameras as well, including Ring’s security cameras made for indoor use. Ring has denied these allegations. There are not many specifics, but the company is said to have “minimum security standards” in general, and appears not to encrypt the storage of customer data. Though data is now encrypted “in transit.”

The legal and civil rights concerns from this technology all seem to come to a head with Ring’s partnerships with local police departments. Six hundred plus police departments, including the Plymouth and Rochester departments, have partnered with Ring. Police departments encourage members of their community to buy Ring, and Ring gives police forces potential access to camera footage. The footage is accessed through a request to the customer, which can be denied, otherwise, police usually require a warrant to force Ring to hand over the footage. California departments though allege they have been able to sidestep the customer, and simply threaten Ring with a subpoena for the footage. If true, there is effectively little stopping Ring from sharing footage with police. Ring has claimed to be working hard to protect consumers privacy but has not answered exactly how often they give police footage without the approval of the customer or a warrant.

How legislatures and regulators handle this massive surveillance network and its partnerships with law enforcement is up in the air at this point. Despite continual backlash to their services, and 30 civil rights groups speaking out against Ring’s corporate practices, there has been little movement on the Federal level it seems, besides a letter from Senator Markey (D-Mass) to Amazon demanding more information on their services. Recently, Amazon replied to Senator Markey, which shed some light on how police can receive and use the data. Amazon stated that police can request 12 hours of footage from any device within a 0.5 mile radius of the crime. Amazon further stated that it does not require police to meet any evidentiary standard before asking for footage.

Despite the relative lack of governmental action currently, it is almost assured some level of government will act on these issues in the near future. For now, though, Ring continues to expand its network, and along with it, concerns over due process, privacy, and law enforcement overreach.


Forget About Quantum Computers Cracking Your Encrypted Data, Many Believe End-to-End Encryption Will Lose Out as a Matter of Policy

Ian Sannes, MJLST Staffer

As reported in Nature, Google recently announced they finally achieved quantum supremacy, which is the point when computers that work based on the spin of qubits, rather than how all conventional computers work, are finally able to solve problems faster than conventional computers. However, using quantum computers is not a threat to encryption any time soon according to John Preskill, who coined the term “quantum supremacy,” rather such theorized uses remain many years out. Furthermore, the question remains whether quantum computers are even a threat to encryption at all. IBM recently showcased one way to encrypt data that is immune to the theoretical cracking ability of future quantum computers. It seems that while one method of encryption is theoretically prone to attack by quantum computers, the industry will simply adopt methods that are not prone to such attacks when it needs to.

Does this mean that end-to-end encryption methods will always protect me?

Not necessarily. Stewart Baker opines there are many threats to encryption such as homeland security policy, foreign privacy laws, and content moderation, which he believes will win out over the right to have encrypted private data.

The highly-publicized efforts of the FBI in 2016 to try to force Apple to unlock encryption on an iPhone for national security reasons ended in the FBI dropping the case when they hired a third party who was able to crack the encryption. This may seem like a win for Silicon Valley’s historically pro-encryption stance but foreign laws, such as the UK’s Investigatory Powers Act, are opening the door for government power in obtaining user’s digital data.

In October of 2019 Attorney General Bill Barr requested that Facebook halt its plans to implement end-to-end encryption on its messaging services because it would prevent investigating serious crimes. Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, admitted it would be more difficult to identify and remove harmful content if such an encryption was implemented, but has yet to implement the solution.

Some believe legislators may simply force software developers to create back doors to users’ data. Kalev Leetaru believes content moderation policy concerns will allow governments to bypass encryption completely by forcing device manufacturers or software companies to install client-side content-monitoring software that is capable of flagging suspicious content and sending decrypted versions to law enforcement automatically.

The trend seems to be headed in the direction of some governmental bypass of conventional encryption. However, just like IBM’s quantum-proof encryption was created to solve a weakness in encryption, consumers will likely find another way to encrypt their data if they feel there is a need.


Pacemakers, ICDs, and ICMs – oh my! Implantable heart detection devices

Janae Aune, MJLST Staffer

Heart attacks and heart disease kill hundreds of thousands of people in the United States every year. Heart disease affects every person differently based on their genetic and ethnic background, lifestyle, and family history. While some people are aware of their risk of heart problems, over 45 percent of sudden heart cardiac deaths occur outside of the hospital. With a condition as spontaneous as heart attacks, accurate information tracking and reporting is vital to effective treatment and prevention. As in any market, the market for heart monitoring devices is diverse, with new equipment arriving every year. The newest device in a long line of technology is the LINQ monitoring device. LINQ builds on and works with already established devices that have been used by the medical community.

Pacemakers were first used effectively in 1969 when lithium batteries were invented. These devices are surgically implanted under the skin of a patient’s chest and are meant to help control the heartbeat. These devices can be implanted for temporary or permanent use and are usually targeted at patients who experience bradycardia, a slow heart rate. These devices require consistent check-ins by a doctor, usually every three to six months. Pacemakers must also be replaced every 5 to 15 years depending on how long the battery life lasts. These devices revolutionized heart monitoring but involve significant risks with the surgery and potential device malfunctioning.

Implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD) are also surgically implanted devices but differ from pacemakers in that they deliver one shock when needed rather than continuous electrode shocks. ICDs are similar to the heart paddles doctors use when trying to stimulate a heart in the hospital – think yelling “charge” and the paddles they use. These devices are used mostly in patients with tachycardia, a heartbeat that is too fast. Implantation of an ICD requires feeding wires through the blood vessels of the heart. A subcutaneous ICD (S-ICD) has been newly developed and gives patients who have structural defects in their heart blood vessels another option of ICDs. Similar to pacemakers, an ICD monitors activity constantly, but will be read only at follow-up appointments with the doctor. ICDs last an average of seven years before the battery will need to be replaced.

The Reveal LINQ system is a newly developed heart monitoring device that records and transmits continuous information to a patient’s doctor at all times. The system requires surgical implantation of a small device known as the insertable cardiac monitor (ICM). The ICM works with another component called the patient monitor, which is a bedside monitor that transmits the continuous information collected by the ICM to a doctor instantly. A patient assistant control is also available which allows the patient to manually mark and record particular heart activities and transmit those in more detail. The LINQ system allows a doctor to track a patient’s heart activity remotely rather than requiring the patient to come in for the history to be examined. Continuous tracking and transmitting allow a patient’s doctor to more accurately examine heart activity and therefore create a more effective treatment approach.

With the development of wearable technology meant to track health information and transmit it to the wearer, the development of devices such as the LINQ system provide new opportunities for technologies to work together to promote better health practices. The Apple Watch series 4 included electrocardiogram monitoring that records heart activity and checks the reading for atrial fibrillation (AFB). This is the same heart activity pacemakers, ICDs, and the LINQ system are meant to monitor. The future capability of heart attack and disease detection and treatment could be massively impacted by the ability to monitor heart behavior in multiple different ways. Between the ability to shock your heart, continuously monitor and transmit information about it, and report to you when your heart rate may be experiencing abnormalities from a watch it seems as if a future of decreased heart problems could be a reality.

With all of these newly developed methods of continuous tracking, it begs the question of how all of that information is protected? Health and heart behavior, which is internal and out of your control, is as personal as information gets. Electronic monitoring and transmission of this data opens it up to cybersecurity targeting. Cybersecurity and data privacy issues with these devices have started to be addressed more fully, however the concerns differ depends on which implantable device a patient has. Vulnerabilities have been identified with ICD devices which would allow an unauthorized individual to access and potentially manipulate the device. Scholars have argued that efforts to decrease vulnerabilities should be focused on protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information transmitted by implantable devices. The FDA has indicated that the use of a home monitor system could decrease the potential vulnerabilities. As the benefits from heart monitors and heart data continue to grow, we need to be sure that our privacy protections grow with it.


Wearable, Shareable, Terrible? Wearable Technology and Data Protection

Alex Wolf, MJLST Staffer

You might consider the first wearable technology of the modern-day to be the Sony Walkman, which celebrates its 40th anniversary this year. After the invention of Bluetooth 1.0 in 2002, commercial competitors began to realize the vast promise that this emergent technology afforded. Fifteen years later, over 265 million wearable tech devices are sold annually. It looks to be a safe bet that this trend will continue.

A popular subset of wearable technology is the fitness tracker. The user attaches the device to themselves, usually on their wrist, and it records their movements. Lower-end trackers record basics like steps taken, distance walked or run, and calories burned, while the more sophisticated ones can track heart rate and sleep statistics (sometimes also featuring fun extras like Alexa support and entertainment app playback). And although this data could not replace the care and advice of a healthcare professional, there have been positive health results. Some people have learned of serious health problems only once they started wearing a fitness tracker. Other studies have found a correlation between wearing a FitBit and increased physical activity.

Wearable tech is not all good news, however; legal commentators and policymakers are worried about privacy compromises that result from personal data leaving the owner’s control. The Health Insurance Portability and Protection Act (HIPAA) was passed by Congress with the aim of providing legal protections for individuals’ health records and data if they are disclosed to third parties. But, generally speaking, wearable tech companies are not bound by HIPAA’s reach. The companies claim that no one else sees the data recorded on your device (with a few exceptions, like the user’s express written consent). But is this true?

A look at the modern American workplace can provide an answer. Employers are attempting to find new ways to manage health insurance costs as survey data shows that employees are frequently concerned with the healthcare plan that comes with their job. Some have responded by purchasing FitBits and other like devices for their employees’ use. Jawbone, a fitness device company on its way out, formed an “Up for Groups” plan specifically marketed towards employers who were seeking cheaper insurance rates for their employee coverage plans. The plan allows executives to access aggregate health data from wearable devices to help make cost-benefit determinations for which plan is the best choice.

Hearing the commentators’ and state elected representatives’ complaints, members of Congress have responded; Senators Amy Klobuchar and Lisa Murkowski introduced the “Protecting Personal Health Data Act” in June 2019. It would create a National Task Force on Health Data Protection, which would work to advise the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) on creating practical minimum standards for biometric and health data. The bill is a recognition that HIPAA has serious shortcomings for digital health data privacy. As a 2018 HHS Committee Report noted, “A class of health records that can be subject to HIPAA or not subject to HIPAA is personal health records (PHRs) . . . PHRs not subject to HIPAA . . . [have] no other privacy rules.”  Dena Mendolsohn, a lawyer for Consumer Reports, remarked favorably that the bill is needed because the current framework is “out of date and incomplete.”

The Supreme Court has recognized privacy rights in cell-site location data, and a federal court recognized standing to sue for a group of plaintiffs whose personally identifiable information (PII) was hacked and uploaded onto the Dark Web. Many in the legal community are pushing for the High Court to offer clearer guidance to both tech consumers and corporations on the state of protection of health and other personal data, including private rights of action. Once there is a resolution on these procedural hurdles, we may see firmer judicial directives on an issue that compromises the protected interests of more and more people.

 


Practical Results of Enforcing the GDPR

Sooji Lee, MJLST Staffer

After the enforcement of the European Union’s(“EU”) General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), Facebook was sued by one of its shareholders, Fern Helms, because its share price fell more than “20 percent” in July 27, 2018. This fall in stock price occurred because the investors were afraid of the GDPR’s potential negative impact on the company. This case surprised many people around the world and showed us how GDPR is sensational regulation that could result in lawsuits involving tremendous amounts of money. This post will articulate what has occurred after enforcement of this gigantic world-wide impacting regulation.

Under GDPR, regulated entities (data controllers and data processors) must obtain prior “consent” from their users when they request customers’ personal data. Each member country must establish Data Protection Authority (“DPA”) to comply with the GDPR. This regulation has a broad applicable range, from EU corporations to non-EU corporations that deal with EU citizens’ personal data. Therefore, after the announcement of this regulation, many United States based global technology corporations which conduct some of their business in European countries, such as Google and Facebook, commenced processes to comply with the GDPR. For example, Facebook launched its own website which explains its effort to comply with GDPR.

Surprisingly, however, despite the large-scale preparation, Google and Facebook were sued for breach of the GDPR. According to a report authored by IAPP, thousands of claims were filed within one month the GDPR’s enforcement date, May 25, 2018. This fact implies that it is difficult to abide by GDPR for current internet-based service companies. Additionally, some companies that are not big enough to prepare to comply with the GDPR, such as the Chicago Tribune and the LA Times, temporarily blocked EU users from its website and some decided to terminate its service in the EU.

One interesting fact is that no one has been fined under GDPR yet. A spokesperson for the United Kingdom’s Information Commissioner’s Office commented “we are dealing with the first GDPR cases but it’s too early to speculate about fines or processing bans at this stage.” Experts expect that calculating fines and processing bans could take another six months. These experts foresee that once a decision is rendered, it could set a standard for future cases which may be difficult to change.

The GDPR, a new world-wide impacting regulation, just started its journey toward proper consumer data protection. It seems many of the issues involved with the GDPR are yet to be settled. For now, no expert can make an accurate prediction. Some side-effects seem inevitable. So, it is time to assess the results of the regulation, and keep trying to make careful amendments, such as expanding or restricting the scope of its applicable entities, to adjust for arising problems.