Intellectual Property

Quantum Computing: Ready To Be Patented!

Shuang Liu, MJLST Staffer

In June 2021, IBM presented its newest and most powerful quantum computer—Q System One. This news highlighted people’s continuing confidence and resolution in the research and development of quantum computing. As a matter of fact, several countries and leading high-tech corporations are investing from millions to billions in various aspects of quantum computing technology, and filing patent applications to protect their research achievement.

(Q System One at Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft, Germany)

This article attempts to provide a brief introduction of quantum computing technology (Part I), a potentiometric analysis of the high-tech corporations in quantum computing industry (Part II), and a discussion of potential legal challenges in obtaining patents related to quantum software (Part III).

I. The Quantum Computing Technology and Its Potential Applications

The world’s most famous cat, Schrödinger’s cat, is both alive and dead until it is observed. A quantum bit (“qubit”) behaves similarly—it is both 0 and 1 until it is measured. A classical computer transmits and processes n-bit information with n bits. In contrast, since a qubit represents 0 and 1 at the same time (that is, a superposition of 0 and 1), a quantum computer transmits and processes 2n-bit information with n qubits. Therefore, if a good algorithm is found and the superposition property is utilized properly, a quantum computer can compute exponentially faster than a classical computer.

However, algorithms for quantum computers (hereinafter “quantum algorithms”) are not easy to find and algorithms for classical computers (hereinafter “classical algorithms”) cannot be readily applied on quantum computers. After all, classical algorithms solve problems in a deterministic way (where bits are either 0 or 1), while a quantum computer by its nature processes probabilistic information (where bits are superpositions of 0 and 1). It took people decades to develop the first quantum algorithm that showed capability of solving real-life problems. To date, although quantum algorithms are still far from enough, the available ones do show a great potential of applications.

The first, surest application is cryptanalysis. Integer factorization plays a key role in cryptanalysis. The Shor’s algorithm, one of the most famous quantum algorithms, is able to factor all integers in polynomial time, which has not been made possible by classical algorithms so far.

Another promising application is predicting new chemicals and materials having certain properties. Properties of chemicals and materials usually depend on a variety of factors and can be too complicated for a classical computer to make simulations. A quantum computer, with a stronger computation power, is expected to be able to make such simulations. To be noted, researchers are hopeful to use a quantum computer to find a way to build materials that can be superconducting at room temperature.

Complex processes, such as biological processes, economic development modelling, energy allocation optimization, and big data processing, are also good candidates for which a quantum computer can use its exceptional computation power.

II. Patent Landscape of Leading Corporations

People’s confidence in the potential of quantum computing leads to a race in patents. In the last five years, nearly a thousand patent applications related to quantum computing have been filed in the US, and a little bit fewer before the WIPO.

The figures below show the number of applications filed by leading corporations related to quantum computing and the number of applications related to specific areas. Among them, IBM is the first active patent applicant, leading other corporations by big margins and showing interest in almost every aspect of quantum computing. Other leading applicants are interested in different aspects of quantum computing. For example, Microsoft is mainly working on the software side (machine learning and optimization), while Intel devotes its most energy on the hardware side (quantum circuits). It is also worth noting that Bank of America has filed many applications in the cryptology aspect of quantum computing—it is endeavoring to be the first to use quantum security keys to protect its data.

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Figure 1

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Figure 2

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Figure 3

Turning our eyes to the world, we can see that Huawei, a Chinese telecommunication company, has filed a large number of quantum computing related applications before the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO). Its major interests reside in quantum communication and securing such communication with cryptographs. NEC, a Japanese electronics corporation is also an active global patent applicant. It mainly focuses on building a quantum computer itself.

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Figure 4

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Figure 5

III. Potential Legal Issues

In the process of obtaining a patent, the most common substantive rejections are novelty and obviousness rejections. For a quantum software application, a patent-eligibility rejection is also likely. The subsections below discuss patent-eligibility and obviousness challenges especially for quantum software applications.

A. Patent Eligibility

The case law on patent eligibility of software has been unclear and inconsistent. This subsection does not attempt to, nor can it, predict the patent eligibility of quantum software. But at least there are more arguments available for patent eligibility of quantum software than those of classical software.

Courts tend to find a software claim ineligible if it is “not tied to any particular novel machine or apparatus, only a general-purpose computer.” From a policy perspective, such claims are disfavored by courts because “[they] would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying ideas and . . . pose . . . risk of pre-emption.”

To facilitate discussion and avoid confusion, the remainder of this and next subsection will discuss with claim 1 ofU.S. Pat. No. US10990677B2 (hereinafter “‘677 claim 1”):

“A method, comprising:

programming a quantum computing device to implement quantum circuits that perform a machine learning technique using one or more qubits of the quantum computing device, wherein the machine learning technique employs principal component analysis based on at least one median estimate stored as a quantum bit string . . . .”

In a nutshell, ‘677 claim 1 recites a machine learning technique implemented by a quantum computing device. It was drafted in a way that it is closely tied to the quantum computing device, in contrast to “a general-purpose computer.” Therefore, if challenged, the patentee can always argue that this method is closely tied to “a particular novel machine,” and can’t possibly preempt all use of the underlying concept in the claim.

It is worth noting that, instead of simply claiming a machine learning method implemented by a quantum computer, the claim ties the implementation with “quantum circuits” and “one or more qubits.” When drafted this way, the patentee has a strong argument that this claim is not an abstract idea under the commonly used pen and paper test,because a human cannot implement quantum circuits and/or use qubits either mentally or by a pen and a piece of paper.

Other quantum software or algorithm patents might have other arguments available. For example, the patent eligibility of an error correction algorithm patent can be supported by the fact that it greatly improved the performance of a quantum computer, which is a common theme of the current case law of patent eligibility.

B. Obviousness

As can be expected, ‘677 claim 1 has been challenged under 35 U.S.C. §103. In the Non-Final Office Action, the Examiner asserted Mork et al. in view of Kappor et al. in further view of Kerner et al. renders the claim obvious, wherein Mork discloses a classical computer implementing a similar machine learning technique, Kerner discloses a quantum computing device, and Kappor recites that “[t]he machine learning acceleration hardware . . . may comprise . . . a quantum computing device” without providing any details. Such a combination of references can be a recipe for obviousness rejections against quantum software claims.

The key for this rejection to stand is the “connecting” reference (in this example, Kappor), that is, how the classical algorithm can be connected to a quantum computing device. As discussed in Section I of this article, it’s not just that the computation powers of a classical computer and a quantum computer are different; the ways they compute are not at all the same.

Accordingly, for this specific example, the rejection is erroneous because Kappor does not provide any details of how to apply its machine learning process to a quantum computing device, let alone providing teachings of how to apply the machine learning technique disclosed by Mork to a quantum computer. In general, a reference that motivates and teaches to apply a classical algorithm on a quantum computer can be extremely difficult to find. That is because, there is few, if any, classical algorithm can be readily applied on a quantum computer!

Therefore, it is fair to say that a reference in the classical software domain is almost never effective to defeat the patentability of a quantum software.

Conclusion

Although quantum computing technology is still in its infancy, people are very confident in its potential. Corporations in the industries of communication, computing, electronics, and even finance have joined the patent race of quantum computing related technologies. The patent space of quantum computing technology is still quite sparce, and a patent on quantum computing can be obtained much more easily now than later.


Akamai Provides a New Induced Infringement Standard, But How Do We Use It?

Ryan J. Connell, MJLST Lead Articles Editor

In the spring 2013 issue of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology Mr. Roy D. Gross examined the use of circumstantial evidence to prove inducement of infringement. Mr. Gross’s article is titled Can an Inference of Intent to Induce Infringement of a Patent Be Drawn Where Other Reasonable Inferences Exist? An Examination of the Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Inducement of Infringement. Mr. Gross ultimately argues that that the doctrine of specific intent to infringe in patent cases should be harmonized with the standard used for inequitable conduct.

It is important to discern the boundaries of specific intent to infringe in light of the recent Akamai case. Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Akamai the Federal Circuit arguably made it easier for a patent owner to hold a person liable for induced infringement of a method claim when no single person performed all the steps of the method. The Akamai decision still requires the alleged inducer to have the specific intent to induce infringement. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308. The results of Akamai are mixed then, on one hand patent owners can now go after those who induced infringement but never induced a single party to infringe the patent. On the other hand the patent owner must still provide evidence of a specific intent to induce infringement.

Proving induced infringement is a difficult task. Direct evidence of inducement is often hard to come by and the patent owner must often resort to using circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent. Mr. Gross suggests courts to weigh the following three factors, in light of circumstantial evidence, when determining if the requisite intent is present: (1) nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe.

Akamai has closed an undesirable loophole in patent law. For Akamai to reach its full potential however, courts and litigators need to understand how to weigh circumstantial evidence that may be more strained in cases where a patent is collectively infringed as opposed to directly infringed by one actor. Articles such as this can help the legal community understand how to use circumstantial evidence in light of the new induced infringement standard.


Akamai Provides a New Induced Infringement Standard, But How Do We Use It?

Ryan J. Connell, MJLST Lead Articles Editor

In the spring 2013 issue of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology Mr. Roy D. Gross examined the use of circumstantial evidence to prove inducement of infringement. Mr. Gross’s article is titled Can an Inference of Intent to Induce Infringement of a Patent Be Drawn Where Other Reasonable Inferences Exist? An Examination of the Use of Circumstantial Evidence to Prove Inducement of Infringement. Mr. Gross ultimately argues that that the doctrine of specific intent to infringe in patent cases should be harmonized with the standard used for inequitable conduct.

It is important to discern the boundaries of specific intent to infringe in light of the recent Akamai case. Akamai Techs. Inc. v. Limelight Networks Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In Akamai the Federal Circuit arguably made it easier for a patent owner to hold a person liable for induced infringement of a method claim when no single person performed all the steps of the method. The Akamai decision still requires the alleged inducer to have the specific intent to induce infringement. Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1308. The results of Akamai are mixed then, on one hand patent owners can now go after those who induced infringement but never induced a single party to infringe the patent. On the other hand the patent owner must still provide evidence of a specific intent to induce infringement.

Proving induced infringement is a difficult task. Direct evidence of inducement is often hard to come by and the patent owner must often resort to using circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent. Mr. Gross suggests courts to weigh the following three factors, in light of circumstantial evidence, when determining if the requisite intent is present: (1) nexus; (2) control; and (3) mitigating evidence of intent not to infringe.

Akamai has closed an undesirable loophole in patent law. For Akamai to reach its full potential however, courts and litigators need to understand how to weigh circumstantial evidence that may be more strained in cases where a patent is collectively infringed as opposed to directly infringed by one actor. Articles such as this can help the legal community understand how to use circumstantial evidence in light of the new induced infringement standard.


Legal Approaches to Synthetic Biology

by Nihal Parkar, UMN Law Student, MJLST Note and Comment Editor

Synthetic biology is to biology what androids are to humans. Synthetic biology allows moving beyond the evolutionary constraints of life as we know it. Instead of being restricted to using or repurposing cellular genetic machinery, we can now shape our own genetic tools from the ground up. Instead of merely discovering genes, we can now fabricate genes and synthesize a genome, by restructuring the architecture of life itself.

Research institutions and corporations who have been at the forefront of synthetic biology have taken different approaches to protecting IP. Some institutions have taken up the mantle of promoting open source synthetic biology, having being inspired by the parallel open source software movement. On the other hand, corporations have largely played close to their chest, and have adopted the traditional practices of protecting their innovation through patents, copyrights, and trademarks. A recent MJLST article by Professor Andrew Torrance (Synthesizing Law for Synthetic Biology, Issue 11.2 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology) examines the challenges posed by intellectual property rights to the openness of the brave new world of synthetic biology.


Countdown Sochi ’14: Will the USOC Avoid Repeat of Ravelry Stitch?

by Comi Sharif, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff
Next month, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) will launch its “Road to Sochi Tour” to count down the final 100 days leading up to the 2014 Winter Olympics. As the games draw near, we are likely to see a rapid increase in the amount of Olympic advertisements and related promotions. From cereal box covers to credit card commercials narrated by Morgan Freeman, materials will flood the market for the weeks leading up to the competition, to the point where one cannot help but get caught up in “Olympic Fever“. The Olympics bring the joy of cheering on our fellow countrymen (and countrywomen) regardless of whether we have ever heard of them or their sport, let alone watched on television before the Games. Though American athletes put in countless hours of commitment in preparation to represent our country, all of it would be for naught without the efforts of the USOC.

Formed in 1894, the USOC is driven by its mission to support U.S. Olympic and Paralympic competitive excellence while exhibiting the values of the Olympic Movement. The key element of this responsibility is generating and allocating revenue. Though the USOC is federally sanctioned under the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act (ASA), the non-profit corporation does not receive federal financial support. For this reason, the USOC relies heavily on sponsorships to fund its programs.

Due to the importance of sponsorships, the USOC has a major incentive to maintain its positive brand along with the reputation of the Olympics as a whole. For this reason, the ASA also grants the USOC exclusive rights to use a number of words and marks in a commercial or athletic context, including the name “United States Olympic Committee,” the International Olympic Committee symbol (consisting of 5 interlocking rings), and the words “Olympic,” and “Olympiad.” Congress has even granted enhanced protections and enforcement powers to the USOC in some circumstances. As part of these rights, the USOC can authorize the use of the protected words and marks by sponsors as well as bring legal action against violators under the Lanham Act. The rationale is that the more control over Olympic intellectual property the USOC holds, the further it can maintain and promote its good name. This, in turn, makes the exclusive right to use Olympic words and marks more valuable to sponsors, which generates more capital that can be used for the U.S. Olympic program.

The scope of the exclusive rights under the ASA has often been a source of controversy, however. Though many alleged infringers discontinue their use upon the receipt of a USOC-issued cease and desist letter, a number of disputes have been brought to court to challenge the scope of the USOC’s protection and enforcement rights under the ASA.

Author Marcella David discusses one case in particular in Trademark Unraveled: The U.S. Olympic Committee Versus Knitters of the World (Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14.2), involving alleged infringement by Ravelry.com in its use of the word “Ravelympics.” Rather than sending a conventional cease and desist letter, the USOC informed Ravelry.com that their use was not only infringing on the USOC’s trademarks, but that their use tends to “denigrate the true nature of the Olympic Games.” Instead of convincing Ravelry.com to switch the name of its event, the letter sparked outrage throughout the online community. Ironically, in an attempt to protect its reputation, the USOC managed to do the exact opposite shortly before the Olympics were set to begin. In her article, David assesses the USOC’s claims of infringement against Ravelry.com while noting areas in need of improvement in the current legal framework of trademark infringement enforcement.

As intellectual property infringement becomes increasingly difficult to prevent and enforce against in the age of the Internet, owners need to be creative and proactive to limit unauthorized use. In regards to the USOC, this means not going too far in enforcing rights, however. So until there is more clarity as to the extent of the USOC’s protection under the ASA, we may be in store for a repeat of the Ravelry fiasco in the coming months. Let the countdown begin!


Will AIA Post-Grant Procedures Reduce Litigation?

by Nihal Parkar, UMN Law Student, MJLST StaffNihal-Parkar-Thumbnail-White-Back.jpgThe America Invents Act (AIA) was signed into law in 2011 and fully went into effect on March 16, 2013. The AIA resulted from efforts to strengthen the US patent system and bring it in conformity with global patenting standards. One of the aims of the AIA was to reduce post-grant litigation related to patent validity. It is common for alleged infringers to challenge the validity of patents that are asserted against them in court. However, such litigation can be expensive and protracted.

Pre-AIA patent law did provide for some processes for challenging patent validity, but they were limited. The AIA tries to expand on pre-existing post-grant patent challenges by providing for patent challenge procedures that mirror litigation (discovery, witness examination, and so on) at an alternative forum for resolving validity disputes: the Patent Trial and Appeal Board at the US Patent and Trademark Office.

It is interesting to contrast pre-AIA scholarly analysis of patent challenge procedures and suggested reforms with post-AIA studies. The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology provides two contrasting articles on point. An earlier, pre-AIA article by Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact (8 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 2006) proposed a multistage post-grant review process. They addressed the lack of discovery and other issues in pre-AIA post-grant processes, and concluded that discovery would be unnecessary as long as the scope of reviewable issues was kept narrow. A recent MJLST note by Kayla Fossen, The Post-Grant Problem: America Invents Falling Short (14 Minn. J.L. Sci. & Tech. 573, 2013), reviews the changes introduced by the AIA, and points out that post-grant processes cannot really undo the damage created by ineffective pre-grant procedures. Therefore, the AIA is unlikely to significantly impact post-grant litigation.


Shapewear Patent War: Case of the Bad Patent?

by Jennifer Nomura, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Jennifer-Nomura.jpgWhen most people think of patents they think of the latest computer technology or advances in medical science; but what about women’s shapewear? For those unaware of what shapewear is, it’s basically the modern version of a corset; it keeps everything pulled in, but (hopefully) more comfortable than a corset. Heather Thomson, founder of Yummie Tummie, has a patent on some of her styles of tank-top shapewear. Corset_Patent_Image.jpgWhen she found out that Spanx, a competing company, was making a very similar looking piece of shapewear, Thomson wasn’t happy. Thomson sent a cease-and-desist letter to Sara Blakely, founder of Spanx and then took to social media to complain. Websites like Forbes and the Huffington Post picked up the story. So far, the situation sounds fairly typical of other patent infringement cases, so why all the press coverage? Did I mention that Heather Thomson is a TV star of Bravo’s Real Housewives of New York? Needless to say, Thomson is not afraid of a little drama. Thomson has declared war against Blakely and Spanx. But Sara Blakely is not the underdog in this situation. Blakely founded Spanx in 2000 and is now a self-made billionaire. Blakely has now filed a declaratory judgment action in court alleging that Spanx is not infringing any of Yummie Tummie’s patents.

Spanx has been in the shapewear business 8 years longer than Yummie Tummie and has its own patents, so this might be the case of the “bad patent”. In an article entitled Patent Reform and Differential Impact, published in Issue 8.1 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, authors Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde define a “bad patent” as one “that should not have been issued.” But Sag and Rohde want to go further. HeatherThomasPatent-cmp.jpg They argue that the term “bad patent” should also include “a patent that was validly issued but is now the subject of hyper-assertion.” The main concern with bad patents is that they “are capable of generating significant revenues and thus have a distorting effect on the allocation of resources in the economy.” This can happen where once a patentee sends a cease-and-desist letter, even if the patent qualifies as a “bad patent,” the alleged infringer will immediately license with the patentee. Or it could be that the parties could take their dispute to court, like Spanx and Yummie Tummie. Now there will be an expenditure of money on both sides trying to settle this issue in court. There is also a drain on public resources as the conflict has to make its way through the court system. Sag and Rohde make several proposed reforms in order to remedy the problem of bad patents. One of their proposed reforms to the litigation process is by fee-shifting. Fee-shifting would require the patentee to pay the costs of litigation if the patent was invalidated based on easily-discoverable prior art. This proposed reform could push potential patent applicants to perform a more comprehensive search through current patents before submitting their application to the PTO. Fee-shifting could prevent bad patents from being issued in the first place, or at least making patentees think twice before they try to enforce their patent against an alleged infringer.

While the public’s interest in the dispute between Yummie Tummie and Spanx has more to do with the reputations of both founders, this situation could revive a push for reform to the patent litigation system. Perhaps there will be a revival of the interest to limit or eliminate “bad patents.”


Supreme Court to the Rescue: The First Sale Doctrine Survives

by Benjamin Hamborg, UMN Law Student, MJLST Articles Editor

Thumbnail-Benjamin-Hamborg.jpgAs predicted inJohn Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng: The Uncertain Future of the First-Sale Doctrine, the Supreme Court last month held, by a 6-3 margin, that the first sale doctrine does apply to works lawfully made outside of the United States. The first sale doctrine, which allows the lawful owner of a copyrighted work to dispose of that copy as he or she sees fit, was in danger of disappearing as applied to works manufactured overseas after the Second Circuit decided in August of 2011 that the doctrine only applied to works made in America.

Hailed by many as a victory for American consumers, See Gary Shapiro, Supreme Court Gives American Consumers Victory Over Copyright Owners in Kirtsaeng vs. John Wiley & Sons, FORBES (March 20, 2013, 9:16 AM), the decision also represents an important victory for American manufacturing. A decision to the contrary by the Supreme Court would have given companies in the United States, particularly publishing companies, an incentive to move manufacturing plants oversees in order to gain unlimited control over the resale of their products. In fact, any company would have been able to gain such control simply by affixing a copyrightable image or other work to an uncopyrightable product, such as a watch. Of course, as pointed out in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, it remains to be seen whether this decision has a negative impact on the rest of the world, as publishers now have a disincentive to sell textbooks at a discounted rate in impoverished countries. See Roy Zwahlen, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished, PATENTLY BIOTECH (March 26, 2013).


Ask Not What Your Country Can Do For Your Patent . . .

by Caroline Marsili, UMN Law Student, MJLST Staff

Thumbnail-Caroline-Marsili.jpgThe candidates aren’t talking about patents (with the exception of a brief quip about IP piracy in last Tuesday’s debate). But if it’s “all about the economy,” they should be talking patent policy.

In the presidential and vice-presidential debates of recent weeks, the candidates have exchanged vitriol and “gotchas,” and have established a contrast in both policy and character for voters. Notably absent from the debates has been discussion of innovation, and more specifically, the role of IP policy in innovation. IP policy would seem an attractive platform for discussing job creation, as IP industries account for a vast portion of the Nation’s jobs and GDP (“IP-intensive industries” accounted for 27.7 of all jobs in the economy in 2010). It’s possible that the candidates find common ground on this issue. Alternatively, the topic is, for the time-being, moot in the wake of the America Invents Act, the full effects of which are yet to be seen.

Since its passage just over a year ago, some critics have expressed doubt that the Act will create jobs and promote innovation as promised. Others argue not that the Act is failing, but that it represents a misplaced effort to reform patent policy.

The solution? “Don’t just reform patents, get rid of them.” A recent working paper by Boldrin & Levine makes the bold case that our patent system is ultimately more trouble than it’s worth. The authors admit that abolishing patents “may seem ‘pie-in-the-sky'” and acknowledge the glut of transitional issues that would need addressing; just the same, they conclude that the key to reforming our patent system is to get rid of it. Their central beef with the system is the want of empirical evidence that it does what it purports to do: promote innovation and productivity. Meanwhile, there are other incentives for innovation and many negative externalities of the patent system.

Other authors have proposed less radical approaches to revamping the patent system. In her recent article in MJLST, “An Organizational Approach to the Design of Patent Law“, Liza Vertinsky also finds that empirical literature fails to decisively connect patents to innovation and economic growth. However, Vertinsky takes a more optimistic approach to the floundering patent system, arguing that policy-makers should seize reform efforts as an opportunity to tailor the patent law to innovation objectives. The America Invents Act, she argues, isn’t a significant change in the direction of patent policy and instead seeks to remedy narrower concerns with administrative backlog, litigation costs and patent quality. In her view, patent policy should be revamped to encourage innovation based on how individuals and organizations–corporations, Congress, the PTO–really function.

Vertinsky’s “organizational approach” entails a new way of thinking about patents in terms of how patent policy, informed by economic theory, should be fashioned to strengthen the organization of innovation rather than focusing on incentivizing acts of invention. For example, patent laws can be tailored to the needs of different innovation processes across different industries. While sweeping changes in patent policy are unlikely at this time (witness the battles encountered in passing and implementing the America Invents Act), Vertinsky’s proposals should inform discussion among policy-makers about what the patent system can and should do. The Obama Administration’s national innovation strategy neglected to give patent policy a more central role in encouraging innovation, but the desire to build an “innovation economy” is certainly there, and a rational and successful patent policy is vital to attaining the kinds of high-level jobs and industry the country needs and the candidates promise.

(Others think patent policy may not matter at all. What do you think?).


The Supreme Court to Decide the Fate of the First-Sale Doctrine in Kirtsaeng

by Benjamin Hamborg, UMN Law Student, MJLST Articles Editor

Thumbnail-Benjamin-Hamborg.jpgLater this month, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., a case which should decide once and for all whether the first-sale doctrine applies to works manufactured outside of the United States. As I described last spring in volume 13 of the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, the case arises from Supap Kirtsaeng’s attempt to take advantage of the disparity in pricing between textbooks manufactured for sale in the United States and those manufactured and sold internationally. Kirtsaeng’s plan involved purchasing textbooks published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.’s wholly-owned subsidiary John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., then reselling the textbooks online to consumers within the United States.

While textbooks published by John Wiley & Sons, (Asia) Pte Ltd. for the international market are nearly identical in terms of content to their U.S. counterparts, the international versions sell for significantly less due to differences in quality and design. When John Wiley & Sons, Inc.–as the registered copyright holder of the United States editions of the works sold by Kirtsaeng–sued for copyright infringement, Kirtsaeng based his defense on the first-sale doctrine, which allows “the owner of a particular copy [of a copyrighted work] . . . lawfully made under this title . . . to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy” without the permission of the copyright holder.

The question the Supreme Court will face on October 29th is whether the first-sale doctrine applies to works manufactured outside of the United States, a question which the Second–in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng–and Ninth Circuits have already answered in the negative. The prospect of nationwide denial of the first-sale doctrine to works manufactured outside of the United States has broad implications with regard to the sale of gray-market goods within the United States. Many large United States retailers, particularly online retailers, use gray-market goods to deliver products to customers at a substantial savings. In fact, there exists “an estimated $63 billion annual market ‘for goods that are purchased abroad, then imported and resold without the permission of the manufacturer.'”

Narrowing of the first-sale doctrine may even affect the ability of libraries in the United States to lend foreign manufactured books. As Andrew Albanese recently pointed out, “if a library bought a book in the U.S. from a U.S. publisher, and that book happened to be printed in China . . . . the uncertainty the Second Circuit interpretation [of the first-sale doctrine] would create for libraries could deter many libraries from lending [the] materials in question.” Finally, if the Second Circuit’s holding is affirmed by the Supreme Court, companies that manufacture copyright-protected goods within the United States will have an incentive to move their manufacturing plants abroad so as to gain greater control over the sale of their products.